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SEARCHING FOR REPUTATION: RECONCILING FREE SPEECH AND 
THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” 
Jeffrey Abramson* 
This article offers a comprehensive assessment of the tension 
between First Amendment law and the European Court of Justice’s 
decision in 2014 granting individuals the right to have search 
engines “forget” certain personal information about them. While 
the ECJ decision is vague on the boundaries of a “right to forget,” 
it correctly locates a problem of “too much speech” for speech’s 
own good as well as for the goods of privacy and reputation. Three 
developments combine to create the problem of too much speech. 
The first is the over-extension of commercial speech doctrine far 
beyond its modest beginnings. The Roberts Court has suggested 
that inherited distinctions between the importance of political and 
commercial speech are in jeopardy, as is the entire notion that the 
First Amendment distinguishes between the importance of speech 
on public and private matters. The second is the sweeping 
characterization of data as if it were already speech, no matter 
how raw and inarticulate the data. The third is the judicial 
treatment of search engine speech as if rankings are mere 
expressions of opinion entitled to heightened First Amendment 
protection against allegation of bias. I conclude by offering modest 
prescriptions for containing what counts as commercial speech 
and for setting expiration dates on how long personal information 
remains online as a way to introduce some amount of “forgetting” 
into the Internet while not going as far as the ECJ did. 	 	
                                                
 *  Professor of Law and Fellow of the Frank Erwin, Jr. Centennial Chair in 
Government, University of Texas School of Law. The author wishes to thank 
colleagues who read and commented on earlier drafts of this Article, including 
Professors Oren Bracha, William E. Forbath, Gary J. Jacobsohn, David M. 
Rabban, Brian Roberts, and Patrick Woolley. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Speak now or forever hold your peace. 
–Book of Common Prayer (1662) 
Never seek to tell thy love / Love that never told can be. 
–William Blake (posthumously 1863) 
The more total society becomes . . . the greater the idle chatter. 
–Theodor W. Adorno (1952) 
Online experience will start with birth, or even earlier. Virtual 
identities will supersede all others, as the trails they leave 
remain engraved online in perpetuity. 
–Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen (2013) 
 
For speech to be speech, it has to stand in contrast to 
something—silence, pauses, gaps, action maybe, thinking before 
speaking, contemplation, reflection, isolation, seclusion, being out 
of touch, beyond the reach of communication or not writing this 
present Article.1  In a tradition dating back at least to Aristotle, 
speech stands as a distinct human activity–distinct not only 
because speech differentiates us from other animals, 2  but also 
because speech is an exceptional occasion even for human beings. 
Speech according to Aristotle is “the peculiarity of man.”3 
By contrast, speech today is our default position.4 We are more 
likely to be in reach of a communications device at all times than 
                                                
 1 “We require such solitude as shall hold us to its revelations when we are in 
the streets and in palaces; for most men are cowed in society, and say good 
things to you in private, but will not stand to them in public. But let us not be the 
victims of words.” Ralph Waldo Emerson, Society and Solitude in 7 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 7–8 (Harvard Univ. Press, 
2007). 
 2 Even a cat trained to say a few sentences in English does not speak. See 
Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying First 
Amendment protection to “Blackie the Talking Cat” on grounds that cats lack 
personhood). 
 3 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 11 (R. F. Stalley ed., Ernest Barker trans., 1995). 
 4 As the Roberts Court has noted, “modern cell phones . . . are now such a 
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars 	
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not.5 We write and email more messages than previous generations 
sent and received letters. 6  We conduct approximately twenty 
billion discrete online searches each month.7 We read more entries 
on Wikipedia in a day than were read on Encyclopedia Britannica 
in a year. 8  We communicate more with Facebook friends than 
anyone could with friends in real space.9 We are in contact with the 
                                                                                                         
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
 5 Ninety percent of American adults own a cell phone and 64 percent own a 
smartphone. 44 percent “have slept with their phone next to their bed because 
they wanted to make sure they didn’t miss any calls, text messages, or other 
updates during the night.” Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH 
INTERNET PROJECT, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-
fact-sheet (last visited June 2, 2015). The Pew study found that similar 
percentages of white, African-American and Hispanic adults own cell phones 
and smartphones. Id. 
 6 “‘[T]he number of worldwide email accounts is expected to increase from 
. . . 3.1 billion in 2011 to nearly 4.1 billion by year-end 2015.’” Matthew 
Sundquist, Online Privacy Protection: Protecting Privacy, the Social Contract, 
and the Rule of Law In the Virtual World, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 153, 161 
(2012). 
 7 Google ranks first with nearly 65 percent of the U.S. market. Bing handles 
19.7 percent on Microsoft sites, followed by Yahoo with 13 percent of the 
search market. comScore Releases February 2015 U.S. Desktop Search Engine 
Rankings, COMSCORE (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/ 
Market-Rankings/comScore-Releases-February-2015-US-Desktop-Search-
Engine-Rankings. Google controls 92 percent of the search market in Europe. 
James Kanter & Mark Scott, Europe Sees Violations of its Antitrust Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2015, at B1. Google recently changed its corporate name to 
Alphabet, but the search subsidiary will still be known as Google. See James B. 
Stewart, Alphabet with a Capital G, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2015, at B1. 
 8 Wikipedia is among the top ten most visited Internet sites. Yochai Benkler, 
A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 375 (2011). 
 9 Aimee Lee Ball, Are 5,001 Facebook Friends One Too Many? N.Y. TIMES, 
May 30, 2010, at ST 1. Facebook establishes the cut-off for friends at 5,001. 
Facebook has 1.44 billion users worldwide, as of 2015. Vindu Goel, Facebook 
Reports Quarterly Results Dominated by Shift to Mobile and Video, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2015, at B3. In addition to logging in to Facebook, persons use their 
Facebook identity as a kind of identity card to log in some ten billion times 
annually to other social apps. Vindu Goel, Facebook to Let Users Limit Data 
Revealed by Log-Ins, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2014, at B1. One out of every six 	
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famous on Twitter10 and the anonymous on Yelp.11 Instagram has 
300 million monthly users who click on posts eighteen times a 
day.12 In the online world, all of these exchanges flow with a speed 
and volume that is almost beyond comprehension. Americans used 
2.3 trillion voice minutes in 2012 and sent six billion text 
messages, or 69,635 every second.13 
Not coincidentally, governments and corporations spend more 
time monitoring our speech, giving the weaving of the World Wide 
Web a different meaning. 14  This astounding amount of 
                                                                                                         
minutes that Americans spend online is spent on Facebook. Vindu Goel, How 
Facebook Sold You Krill Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014, at B4. 
 10 As of April of 2015, Twitter reported having 308 million monthly average 
users. Vindu Goel, Ad Growth Disappoints at Twitter; Shares Fall, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2015, at B1. These users spent an average of 7.2 minutes a day on 
Twitter’s mobile apps. Vindu Goel, World Cup Gave Twitter a Big Burst in 
Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, at B1. 
 11 Yelp had a monthly average of 142 million visitors during the first quarter 
of 2015. About Yelp, YELP, http://www.yelp-press.com/ 
phoenix.zhtml?c=250809&p=irol-press (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). Citing lack 
of jurisdiction, one state supreme court overturned lower court rulings that 
would have required Yelp to disclose the identity of anonymous reviewers in 
connection with a defamation suit. Justin Jouvenal, Yelp Won’t Have to Turn 
Over Names of Anonymous Users After Court Ruling, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 
2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/yelp-wont-have-
to-turn-over-names-of-anonymous-users-after-court-
ruling/2015/04/16/aeb322c6-e39a-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html. 
 12 Vindu Goel, It’s Official: Instagram is Bigger than Twitter, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2014, 12:18 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/its-
official-instagram-is-bigger-than-twitter. Facebook owns Instagram. Kashmir 
Hill, Ten Reasons Why Facebook Bought Instagram, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2012, 
5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/04/11/ten-reasons-
why-facebook-bought-instagram/. 
 13 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35–36, n.56 (D. D.C. 2013). The 
average cell phone user checks the device 150 times a day. Max Chafkin, 
Cyborgs Won’t Be the Only Ones to Love Next-Gen Wearables, FAST CO. (Sept. 
9, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://fastcodesign.com/3035233/innovation-by-design-
2014/cyborgs-wont-be-the-only-ones-to-love-next-gen-wearables. 
 14 “Like any web, it can wrap itself around you . . . . [E]verything we do . . . 
[is] broken down into data, . . . mined in invasive expeditions in the name of 
commerce and government surveillance.” E. Doctorow, The Promise – and 
Threat – of the Internet, THE NATION, Dec. 4, 2013, at 4, 5. 
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communications begs the question: do we have “too much 
speech?” 
In 2014, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the highest 
court of the European Union, gave an emphatic yes to this 
question,15 widening the gap between American First Amendment 
jurisprudence and European law. The European Union now 
requires search engines to “forget” certain information about an 
individual when it is “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant 
[to any public purpose]” and when that information is harmful to 
the privacy and reputation of the person.16 This so-called “right to 
have information forgotten” has its roots in the decisions of several 
European nations after World War II to codify a right to human 
dignity that even speech must respect.17 
In this Article, I offer a qualified defense of the European 
Court’s view that the digital spread of speech threatens important 
social norms that we try to capture in terms such as dignity or 
privacy. However, the ECJ decision left the right to have 
information “forgotten” so vaguely defined as to provoke well-
deserved criticism that the ruling requires internet services, upon 
request, to purge search results of anything embarrassing to 
individuals. I will explore these difficulties taking into account the 
tension between the way new technologies empower us with more 
speech opportunities and yet disempower us by ceding control over 
everything we say to the copying, replicating, and transmitting of 
data, the banal along with the intimate. In the digital world, any 
                                                
 15 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. ___, ¶93, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065. 
 16 Id. 
 17  The most well-known example is the provision in German law that 
prohibits Holocaust denial. See Winfried Brugger, The Treatment of Hate 
Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part I), 4 GERMAN L. J. 1, 3 (2003). 
Article I of the Basic Law of Germany reads: “Human dignity shall be 
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Constitution] May 
16–22, 1949, art. 1 (Ger.). See Carl Friedrich, The Political Theory of the New 
Democratic Constitutions, 12 REV. OF POL. 215, 217 (1950). 
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item posted may live on forever. 18  We must adjust our social 
interactions accordingly.19 
In suggesting that we may have too much speech, I have both a 
legal and a normative argument in mind. The legal argument turns 
on whether every gathering and transmission of data, no matter 
how inarticulate and commercial in nature, counts as speech for 
First Amendment purposes. Recent court decisions draw analogies 
between rankings “expressed” by search engines and opinions 
published in traditional media. Just as the press cannot be sued for 
a “false” or “biased” opinion, so a search company cannot be liable 
for its subjective opinions about which sites provide the most 
relevant answers to users’ queries.20 Moreover, personal data that 
used to be protected by privacy laws becomes protected instead 
within the First Amendment rights of marketers to buy and sell.21 I 
argue that such uses of the First Amendment call into question the 
basic settlement of post-New Deal constitutional law. That post-
New Deal settlement distinguished between the deference courts 
owe to state economic regulation and the scrutiny courts should 
give to laws restricting fundamental noneconomic liberties, such as 
freedom of speech.22 As what we categorize as speech becomes 
near ubiquitous in our information society, the distinction between 
suspect regulations of speech and permissible regulation of 
commercial data enterprises collapses. 
                                                
 18 But cf. Jill Lepore, The Cobweb, NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2015, at 34–41 
(explaining how posts on the Internet often disappear). Lepore reports on efforts 
to archive all Internet material, noting that if and when that happens, “the past 
will be inescapable, which is as terrifying as it is interesting.” Id. at 41. For 
information on the life cycle of information on the Internet, see Meg Leta 
Ambrose, It’s About Time: Information Life Cycles, and the Right to be 
Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 372 (2013). 
 19 In his short story, Funes the Memorious, Jorge Luis Borges explored how 
burdened speech became in the presence of the title character who would 
remember forever everything said to him. For an exploration of how social 
interaction, as well as self-understanding, change when remembering, and not 
forgetting, becomes the norm, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE 
VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 112–127 (2009). 
 20 See infra Part IV. 
 21 See infra Part III. 
 22 See infra Part III.C. 
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From the normative point of view, I offer two related 
arguments. First, I argue there may be too much speech for 
speech’s own internal good.23 Second, I argue there is too much 
speech for the good of external values such as reputation, privacy 
and individual control over personal information.24 More speech is 
not always good for speech itself, since more speech for some 
threatens less effective speech for others;25 speedy speech does not 
comport with accuracy; 26  and speech that is always “on” may 
recede into so much banal chatter or background noise. 27  My 
argument is not that more speech has to corrupt discourse. There 
are contexts in which a more speech, the better approach enriches 
our democracy, our economy, our individual autonomy, and our 
search for knowledge.28 I argue only that we should be concerned 
                                                
 23 “The great obstacle to consumers getting what they want will no longer be 
that there are too few products available; it will be that there are too many. The 
new system, by reducing barriers to entry, will make much more material 
accessible to consumers. Some of it will be good; most will be junk.” Eugene 
Volokh, Symposium, Emerging Media Technology and the First Amendment: 
Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J. 1805, 1815 (1995). 
 24 I am indebted to Professor Oren Bracha, my colleague at the University of 
Texas School of Law, for reading an earlier draft and suggesting I sharpen the 
distinction between the internal harm too much speech does to itself and the 
external harm it does to important values other than speech. 
 25 “[S]tate-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant 
role in the Nation’s marketplace, but also permit them to use ‘resources amassed 
in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace.’” Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 
(1990), overruled by, Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S 310, 
363–65 (2010). 
 26 Approximately forty percent of Facebook accounts purporting to be from a 
Fortune 100 company are fakes. Goel, supra note 12. See also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Symposium, Emerging Media Technology and the First Amendment: The First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L. J. 1757, 1765 (1995) (“[Some speech 
imposes] risks of sensationalism, ignorance, failure of deliberation, and 
balkanization.”). 
 27  See Twitter Study, PEAR ANALYTICS 1, 4–5 (2009), 
http://www.pearanalytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Twitter-Study-
August-2009.pdf (finding 40.1% of tweets randomly sampled during a two week 
period were babble). 
 28  For positive contributions of Twitter to news reporting, see Chrystia 
Freeland, Why #RussiaInvadedUkraine Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2014, at 	
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about the emergence of short and quick speech practices that favor 
a new generation of sound “bytes” over the Aristotelian regard for 
the slower, intermittent but distinct capacity speech gives us to 
shape our world according to norms and ideals that could not exist 
apart from speech tied to reason and reflection. 
In addition to harming speech, more speech sometimes harms 
outside or competing values. Consider the following familiar 
symptoms of democratic dysfunction: campaigning has become 
almost permanent, to the detriment of governance;29 money speaks 
for some donors but saps public confidence in electoral integrity;30 
the same technology that makes speech abundant makes state or 
corporate surveillance of that speech also abundant;31 hatemongers 
troll online, using anonymity to undermine civility 32  and 
                                                                                                         
A21. See also David Carr, The View from #Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2014, at B1 (“[I]n a situation hostile to traditional reporting, the crowd sourced, 
phone-enabled network of information that Twitter provides has proved 
invaluable.”). 
 29 William A. Galston, The “Permanent Campaign” = Perpetual Paralysis, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/william-
galston-the-permanent-campaign-perpetual-paralysis-1414539559. 
 30 “[T]he financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of 
corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process.” 
Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens, 
J. dissenting). 
 31 Jack Balkin, Symposium, Freedom of the Press: Old-School/New-School 
Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2305–06 (2014) (“[The] battle cry 
of cyberactivists in the early twenty-first century was . . . that ‘information 
wants to be free.’ We now understand that information also wants to be 
collected, collated, analyzed, and used for surveillance and control.”). For the 
connection between too much speech and too much surveillance, see infra Part 
VI.A. 
 32 See Farhad Manjoo, Web Trolls Winning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at 
B1; Rebecca Mead, The Troll Slayer, NEW YORKER, Sept. 1, 2014, at 30–38 
(noting vicious online misogyny in the U.K.); Musetta Durkee, Note, The Truth 
Can Catch the Lie: The Flawed Understanding of Online Speech in In re 
Anonymous Online Speakers, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 773, 811, n.188 (2011) 
(citing Article documenting hateful comments posted on a digital tribute site for 
a 17-year-old suicide victim). 
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sometimes openly making threats. 33  In addition, the variety of 
cable television channels and of Internet websites accommodates 
the tastes and politics of us all, but often on separate channels or 
sites, to the loss of common references.34 Google speech controls 
online reputations that chain link persons to their worst moments.35 
Power and control over personal information flows from 
individuals to a handful of large technology companies that 
monetize private data into advertiser-valued information.36 
I do not mean to suggest that only one model of speech—
rational and engaged in reciprocal conversation—is worthy of First 
Amendment protection. Neither politics nor ordinary social 
conversation takes place in a seminar room, and all manner of 
slogans, symbols, and chants are clearly protected speech, even 
when tied to the mobilizations of emotion rather than reason.37 My 
argument is not meant to winnow out such recognizable forms of 
speaking, but rather it aims to address the question: what is the best 
understanding of the communication that search engines facilitate? 
Is Google a speaker entitled to First Amendment protection? Or is 
a search engine simply a tool, albeit a magnificent one, that 
furthers the speech of others? What would it even mean to say 
search engines “speak” to us?38 Is a search engine our advisor? 
Does it have opinions? Is Google a publisher or editor like the New 
                                                
 33 On the issue of what constitutes posting a true threat on the Internet, see 
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (overturning the 
defendant’s conviction for threatening his ex-wife online and holding that 
criminal convictions for online threats require evidence that a defendant used 
words for the purpose of making a threat or with actual knowledge that the 
words would be viewed as a threat). 
 34 See Jeffrey Abramson, Second-Order Diversity Revisited, 55 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 739, 755–56 (2014). 
 35 See infra Part V. 
 36 See infra Part III. 
 37 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects the emotional as well as ideational component of speech 
such as taping the phrase “Fuck the Draft” on a jacket). 
 38 True, one can talk back to a search engine in ways one could not talk back 
to a television in the old days. But no one thinks a smoke detector and alarm 
system are engaged in protected free speech when they communicate with one 
another. 
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York Times? These questions are still new enough to have no 
definitive answers.39 
My project in this Article is largely diagnostic, though I do 
conclude with a set of prescriptions. I hope to describe the problem 
I call “too much speech” persuasively enough to force 
reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s libertarian commitment to 
the more speech, the better norm as if the phrase was self-
justifying. As important as expanding the reach of speech is, so too 
is protecting the power of people to shelter themselves from 
misuses of personal data to the detriment of privacy, reputation and 
dignity. My diagnosis is that free speech principles are being 
strategically used to cut off debates about Internet governance 
before they even begin. It is important to locate these normatively 
misplaced uses of the First Amendment so as to open room for 
reasonable Internet regulations. 
I begin in Part II by tracing the development of First 
Amendment law from an era of too little speech to our current era 
of too much speech. The era of too little speech was characterized 
by censorship, punishment of dissenters, and technologically 
enforced scarcity in the early days of broadcasting. In the face of 
these obstacles, the rallying cry justifiably became the more 
speech, the better. 40 The maxim captioned many of speech’s most 
historic victories, and it took firm root both in judicial doctrine and 
the popular imagination. Sometimes it spawned disagreement, as 
over applications of clear and present danger doctrine.41 In time, it 
achieved a working consensus on many issues.42 
                                                
 39 See Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1629, 1646–53 (2014). 
 40 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 41 Disagreement over clear and present danger doctrine prompted the famous 
Holmes-Brandeis dissents, beginning in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 
(1919). Through the first half of the 20th century, clear and present danger was a 
speech-restrictive doctrine. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
(upholding convictions of Socialist Party members); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding convictions Communist Party members). But 
by 1969, clear and present danger doctrine became more speech-protective as a 	
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In Part III, I argue that the growing equation of data with 
speech, no matter how raw and inarticulate the data is, threatens to 
upset the always precarious balance between maintaining privacy 
while facilitating the free flow of information. The fact that so 
much personal information about us is now in the databases of 
corporations and governments is a large reason why too much 
speech is a problem. 
In Part IV, I discuss the special case of search engines and 
speech. “Search” has quickly become one of the major forces for 
knowledge and commerce on the Internet. Against the argument 
that search engines “speak,” I will argue that search engines are 
extraordinarily valuable tools for facilitating the speech of others. 
But like other tools or conduits of communication, they are not 
entitled to the heightened First Amendment protection courts are 
now giving them. Too much speech for search engine companies 
threatens the speech of web publishers who fare poorly in search 
rankings, perhaps unfairly at times. We need to prevent the First 
Amendment from being used to shield search engine companies 
against charges of bias or deception. 
In Part V, I turn to the ECJ decision on “the right to be 
forgotten” as a way of reconciling speech and reputation. In Part 
VI, I argue that too much speech paradoxically spawns too much 
monitoring and surveillance of that speech. 
In Part VII, I turn from diagnosis to prescription. If we are to 
undo speech corruption of discourse and democracy, I suggest 
                                                                                                         
unanimous Court in a per curiam decision held that advocacy of opinions that 
fell short of attempting to incite imminent violence or lawless action was 
protected speech. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 42 So-called “conservative” judges such as Justice Scalia have accepted that 
even flag burners are protected by the more speech, the better approach. See, 
e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416–17 (1989). So-called “liberal” justices 
such as Justice Ginsburg have accepted that buffer zones outside abortion 
facilities cannot be so wide as to prevent protesters from effective opportunities 
to speak. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537–41 (2014). Both sides 
swallowed hard and included even gay-baiting protests within hearing of the 
funeral of a fallen soldier as within the protections offered by the norm of the 
more speech, the better. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457–58 (2011). 
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several remedies but two in particular. First, not all information 
exchanged during commercial transactions is entitled to First 
Amendment protection. In 1976, the Court first recognized the 
doctrine of commercial speech, striking down a state law that 
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription 
drugs.43 That decision sensibly focused on the considerable health 
interests consumers have in obtaining prescription drugs at 
affordable prices.44 Nothing in the decision committed the Court to 
turning the First Amendment into protection of all advertising, for 
example price ads for tobacco products.45 Nor must the doctrine of 
commercial speech expand into a doctrine protecting the free 
speech rights of the Googles, Facebooks, and Amazons of the 
Internet to “speak” to third parties with the personal data we 
provided them to buy a product. However, this is exactly what is 
happening, to the degradation of free speech principles. 
A second prescription is to follow Europe’s lead by developing 
a more robust concept of individual dignity. Those sympathetic to 
the critique of too much speech generally rely on notions from 
privacy or libel law to balance claims of free speech against claims 
of reputation. But privacy regulations can only do so much in an 
online environment where we seemingly consent to have our 
personal data gathered, stored, and transmitted. The ECJ’s 
particular prescription of giving individuals a right to have online 
information about them “forgotten” may be flawed, but it does 
point us in the right direction. The prescription for the ills of too 
much speech has to be one that restores significance to the act of 
                                                
 43 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 770–71 (1976). 
 44 Id. at 755, 763–64. 
 45 But see Lorrillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570–71 (2011) 
(striking down restrictions on tobacco advertising). Consider also the dispute 
over a Congressional law requiring cigarette companies to post a graphic 
warning on all cigarette packs. One court of appeals struck down the regulations 
the FDA promulgated pursuant to the statute. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 
Food & Drug Admin., 696 F. 3d. 1205, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Another court 
of appeals upheld the Congressional statute against a facial challenge. Discount 
Tobacco & Lottery Co. v. Food & Drug Admin, 674 F.3d. 509, 551 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
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consenting to making personal information public. Individuals who 
have no choice but to consent if they are to use the services of 
online platforms have not volunteered to surrender power over 
their personal data in any meaningful way. Persons without power 
to control what they reveal about themselves in public are persons 
stripped of a basic human dignity. 
Complaints about too much speech are as old as the Tower of 
Babel.46 At a time of continuing repression abroad,47 we do well to 
acknowledge the considerable advances an open Internet makes 
possible at home. But as in the biblical story where seven years of 
plenty gave way to seven years of famine, we can handle the 
opportunities created by our bounty of speech well or poorly. As a 
nation we responded to the rise of railroads with laws against rate 
discrimination.48 We responded to the rise of radio and television 
by creating a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), 
charged with regulating the airwaves in the public interest,49 and a 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting to take some bandwidth out of 
private hands.50 In line with that tradition, the FCC recently moved 
to regulate Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) as public utilities 
required to provide access to the Internet in nondiscriminatory 
ways.51 The adoption of so-called net neutrality rules is a hopeful 
                                                
 46  Genesis 11:1–9. For an old gripe from 1710, see Jonathan Swift, The 
Examiner, in 1 THE WORKS OF JONATHAN SWIFT 300 (1880) (“[F]alsehood flies 
and the truth comes limping after it.”). A version usually but wrongly attributed 
to Mark Twain is that “a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth 
is putting on its shoes.” See Benkler, supra note 8, at 348 (citing to wrongful 
attribution of quotation to Twain in Thomas Friedman, Too Good to Check, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A33). 
 47 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher & Paul Mozur, Sealed Tight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
22, 2014, at B1 (describing China’s “great firewall” restricting access to Google 
and other web sites); see also Edward Wong & Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Beijing, 
Blocking Social Media Sites, Tries to Keep a Tight Lid on News of Unrest, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2014, at A10 (describing China’s propaganda department’s 
directive to delete any mention of the disorder in Hong Kong). 
 48 Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 49-41, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
 49 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151ff (2012). 
 50 Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2012). 
 51 Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Votes to Regulate the Internet as a 
Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2015, at B1. For cable and telecom company 	
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sign that governance is maturing on the Internet. The concern in 
this Article is whether similar regulations for the public good will 
develop for the interactive computer services—the Googles, 
Facebooks, Twitters, Instagrams and the like—running on the 
Internet.  
II.  FROM TOO LITTLE SPEECH TO TOO MUCH SPEECH 
Before there was too much speech, there was too little speech. 
The classic cases that gave rise to modern First Amendment law 
centered on the harms to democracy when government prevented 
dissenters from criticizing public policies or advocating unpopular 
points of view. 52  The birthing process was slow and painful. 
Although the Supreme Court initially gave government wide 
leeway to punish dissent during time of war as an obstruction of 
the war effort, it slowly shaped a more protective paradigm.53 
The major prong of the speech protective paradigm, as it took 
shape from the end of World War I through the Vietnam War, was 
the principle of content neutrality. Simply put, the principle is that 
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”54 Law can 
regulate expressions that threaten to incite imminent violence or 
unlawful conduct55 or fall within historic categories never deemed 
to have speech value, such as obscenity, libel, or fighting words.56 
                                                                                                         
resistance to the FCC’s proposal to regulate ISPs as public utilities, see Steve 
Lohr, F.C.C. Plans Strong Hand to Regulate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2015, at B1. 
 52 For an account of imprisonment of persons who spoke against American 
entrance into World War I, see PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE 
ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 128–32 (1979). 
 53  Compare the Court’s initial record of affirming convictions of anti-war 
protesters, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), with the Court’s 
eventual use of neutrality principles to protect a protester who wore a jacket 
displaying the words, “Fuck the Draft.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971). 
 54 Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 55 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 56 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942), the Court 
noted that obscenity, libel, and fighting words were categories of speech outside 	
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Consistent with neutrality toward messages, law can provide for 
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations of speech. 57 
Likewise, government may justify incidental effects on speech that 
result from pursuing compelling state interests that have nothing to 
do with the content of speech.58 However, the concept of neutrality 
bars government from justifying prohibitions on speech by 
declaring a given message harmful in and of itself.59 
At first, the theory driving speech protection located the value 
of speech in its service to the ends of democratic government. 
Justice Cardozo referred to speech as “the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other freedom.”60 Justice 
Brandeis wrote in similar means-ends fashion about the connection 
between free speech and self-government.61 Before Brandeis and 
Cardozo, Thomas Jefferson had laid out the same defense of 
speech as a necessary condition of democracy.62 
Like judges, philosophers at first placed special value on the 
worth of political speech. “The primary purpose of the First 
Amendment,” Alexander Meiklejohn wrote in 1948, “is . . . that all 
the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which 
                                                                                                         
the protections of the First Amendment. Although this remains true, the Court 
has scrutinized obscenity, libel, and fighting word statutes to make sure they do 
not intrude into areas of constitutionally protected speech. See R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386–87 (1992). 
 57 See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1941). 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
 59 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416–17 (1989). 
 60 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
 61 “Those who won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would 
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection 
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 62 “If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union, or to change its 
republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with 
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.” 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Inaugural Address, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 1, 3 (1897). 
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bear upon our common life.”63 The plausible argument ran from 
more speech on public issues leading to more informed citizens 
and in turn to better democracy. 64  However, although the 
democratic argument was highly protective of political speech, 
critics faulted it for being underinclusive when it came to 
protecting speech about private matters.65 
In time the classic battles for more speech opened a second and 
broader front against too little speech. The idea took hold that 
speech had intrinsic as well as instrumental value. Individual self-
expression became an end in itself, since no individual was truly 
free who lacked power to shape the contents of his or her mind.66 
The linguistic shift from “freedom of speech” to “freedom of 
expression” or better still “freedom of self-expression” was a sign 
of the theoretical shift behind the phrases.67 The Court has cited the 
inherent value of individual autonomy to extend the protection of 
the First Amendment to such nonpolitical matters as commercial 
advertising, 68  art, 69  or nude dancing as art. 70  Sometimes, 
                                                
 63  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 88–89 (1948). 
 64  These theories tended to leave the end product of “better democracy” 
vaguely defined. John Stuart Mill taught that pluralism in speech is what enables 
truth to defeat falsity in democracies. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in 18 
COLLECTED WORKS OF J. S. MILL 228–260 (J. M. Robson ed., 1977). Skeptics 
about objective truths argue that tolerance of speech makes representative 
democracy achieve “truth” only in the sense of making decisions more 
responsive to public opinion. ROBERT DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACY 10–11 (1982). 
 65 See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr. “Book Review,” 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 
(1949). For one scholar who follows that part of Meiklejohn’s theory that sees 
free speech as serving the “central democratic goal [of] reflective and 
deliberative debate,” see Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1762. 
 66 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) 
(positing individual “self-fulfillment” as the sovereign First Amendment value). 
 67 Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 303, 306 (1991) (asserting that “freedom of expression is a public 
good”). 
 68 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 770–71 (1976). 
 69 See Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 
169 (2012). 
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commentators attempted to stretch the democratic argument to 
explain the connection between individual and collective meanings 
of self-rule.71 Other times, for instance in Justice Scalia’s remarks 
made about the First Amendment’s “obvious” protection of 
Jackson Pollock’s most abstract paintings,72 the Justice finds no 
need to locate some putative service of abstract art to politics. 
In recent years, the Court has adopted an increasingly 
libertarian philosophy about free speech, holding that content as far 
removed from the workings of political democracy as snuff 
movies73 and violent video games74 are nonetheless protected forms 
of self-expression.75 The Court’s recent campaign finance decisions 
offer the clearest example of its libertarian tilt. In Citizens United 
v. Federal Elections Commission,76 the Supreme Court overruled 
                                                                                                         
 70 Compare Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75–77 (1981) (holding 
that the First Amendment protects live nude dancing against a zoning law 
prohibiting adult stores from featuring it), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 
560, 570–71 (1991) (upholding requirement that nude dancers wear some cover 
over breasts and genitals). 
 71  Meiklejohn responded to critics by saying that the self-government 
rationale explained why we protect art and literature, since they help voters 
acquire “the knowledge, intelligence, [and] sensitivity to human values . . . 
which, so far as possible, a ballot should express.” Meiklejohn, The First 
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256; see also Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–64 (advertising prescription drug prices 
contributes information on a matter for public debate). 
 72 For this example, see Tushnet, supra note 69, at 169. 
 73 United States. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 74 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 950 (2011). 
 75  As opposed to the libertarian emphasis on maximizing the free speech 
rights of individuals, egalitarians invoke the connection between speech and 
democracy to defend state legislation promoting equality in speech in certain 
situations. In the era of broadcasting, for instance, egalitarians defended equal 
access rules and the Fairness Doctrine. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
395 U.S. 367 (1969). For the contrast between libertarian and egalitarian views 
on free speech, compare Eugene Volokh, Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: 
A New Legal Paradigm? Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1091–93 (2000) [hereinafter Troubling Implications], with 
Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term, Comment: Two Concepts of 
Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145–46 (2010). 
 76 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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its own precedents77 and declared that the more speech, the better 
approach included the right of corporations and unions to use their 
treasuries to fund independent electioneering communications right 
up until Election Day.78 Citizens United repudiated any egalitarian 
notion that the speech of independent corporate expenditure groups 
could be limited out of concern for leveling the electoral playing 
field. 79  In a recent interview defending the Citizens United 
decision, Justice Scalia specifically invoked “the more speech, the 
better” norm as the sovereign First Amendment principle.80 
Money’s metamorphosis from thing to speech is characteristic 
of the too much speech era. Reasonable persons disagree on 
whether there is too much money in politics or whether corporate 
contributions and independent expenditures have as much potential 
to corrupt the political process as critics argue.81 This Article does 
not seek to resolve those disagreements; rather its concern is with a 
more general phenomenon that the transmogrification of money 
into speech represents. 
                                                
 77  See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 
(1990); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003) 
(noting that the government has an interest in preventing the public from losing 
faith in the electoral process that results from moneyed speech drowning out the 
speech of others). 
 78 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. 
 79 “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements 
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment . . . .” Id. at 349–50 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)). 
 80  Matt Vasilogambros & Sarah Mimms, Scalia Defends Citizens United 
Decision, Reflects on Term in Rare TV Appearance, NATIONAL JOURNAL (July 
18, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/scalia-defends-citizens-
united-decision-reflects-on-term-in-rare-tv-appearance-20120718. 
 81 While there is no doubt that the amount of money spent by independent 
groups during campaigns has vastly increased in recent years, see Ashley 
Parker, Outside Spending Drives a Deluge of Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 
2014, at A1, there is little evidence that big donors are backing winning 
candidates, see Andrew Mayersohn, Four Years After Citizens United: The 
Fallout, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
news/2014/01/four-years-after-citizens-united-the-fallout/. 
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In the same era that the Court extended First Amendment 
protection to money as speech, it also bestowed the First 
Amendment’s protection on commercial advertising for the first 
time. 82 This broadening of what counts as speech continues apace 
on the Internet, permitting search engine companies to invoke the 
First Amendment as a shield against legal regulation of their 
business. More generally, a world of too much speech comes into 
existence whenever commercial data migrates en masse into the 
free speech column, to the detriment of the autonomy persons once 
enjoyed to control access to personal information.83 
Two questions loom. The first is how to distinguish 
commercial speech, largely protected against government 
interference, from commercial conduct subject to reasonable legal 
regulations.84 The second is whether commercial speech is equal in 
value to political speech.85 The answers to these two questions will 
go a long way to determining whether or not we live in an era of 
too much speech.    
                                                
 82 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 770–71 (1976). Prior to this decision, many states restricted advertising by 
professions, such as by lawyers. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (overturning restrictions). 
 83 For argument to this effect, see infra Parts III.A and III.B. 
 84 Compare Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (stating 
that regulation of marketing of prescription drugs is a restriction on speech), 
with IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–54 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding 
similar regulation in another state is a regulation of conduct, not speech). 
 85 Compare Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (subjecting restrictions on commercial speech to 
intermediate scrutiny as opposed to the strict scrutiny that restraints on political 
speech receives), with Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (“A 
‘consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far 
keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.’”); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Commentary: Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 
557 (“It is impossible to develop a system of free expression without making 
distinctions between low and high value speech, however difficult and 
unpleasant that task may be.”). 
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III.  DATASPEAK: THE OVEREXTENSION OF COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH DOCTRINE 
In the world of big data—also known as metadata—algorithms 
crawl through haystacks of raw information looking for new 
needles of knowledge.86  We tell machines something about our 
preferences every time we buy a product, and they speak back to 
us with predictions about our future preferences. 87  They 
communicate a profile of our preferences (after removing personal 
identifiers) to advertisers interested in reaching in the aggregate 
persons with particular buying tastes. 88  Elsewhere, workplace 
scientists slice and dice data about employee performance to 
develop tests for hiring and promotion.89  The National Security 
Agency (“NSA”) sits on its own haystack of dialed telephone 
numbers.90 When necessary, the agency combs through it to see 
who might have called a person who in turned called the number of 
a terrorism suspect. 91  In short, there is a significant amount of 
dataspeak going on.92 
Data enthusiasts turn to the First Amendment to protect the free 
flow of data from obstacles that privacy regulations are meant to 
create. 93  Even the most enthusiastic supporters of information 
                                                
 86 According to IBM, “Big data is being generated by everything around us at 
all times. Every digital process and social media exchange produces it. Systems, 
sensors and mobile devices transmit it.” What is Big Data, IBM, 
http://ibm.com/big-data/us/en/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 87 See, e.g., Bracha, supra note 39, at 1649 (posing the example of a search 
where the user tells the search engine her tastes in movies and the search engine 
makes recommendations for future movies to watch). 
 88  See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/about-
ads.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 89 Don Peck, The Future of Work, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2013, at 73. 
 90 See infra Part VI.A. 
 91 Spencer Ackerman, NSA Warned to Rein in Surveillance as Agency Reveals 
Even Greater Scope, THE GUARDIAN (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/17/nsa-surveillance-house-hearing. 
 92 “There’s been a real sea change in the past five years, where the quantities 
have just grown so large—petabytes, exabytes, zetta—that you start to be able to 
do things you never could before.” Peck, supra note 89, at 80. 
 93 See Troubling Implications, supra note 75, at 1091–94; Jane R. Bambauer, 
Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014). 
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freedom concede the need for a narrow band of privacy, protecting 
sensitive information of the sort contained in medical94 or student 
records.95 However, they suggest that most data is not intimate in 
these ways and should be fair game in a society devoted to the free 
flow of information. 96  They turn to the First Amendment with 
arguments that data is speech.97 
Treating commercial data gathering as a First Amendment 
activity is at the core of the problem of too much speech. 
Economic activities that should be subject to reasonable state 
regulation become free speech activities, apparently as important 
to the values of the First Amendment as political speech.98 
This Section will argue that commercial speech doctrine, 
sensible in its origins, is being put to uses for which it was never 
intended. In 1976, a group representing persons with conditions 
requiring use of prescription drugs filed suit against the Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy. At issue was a board regulation that prohibited 
licensed pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription 
drugs.99 It is telling that the Court refrained from announcing any 
free speech right in pharmacists to advertise.100 Instead, the Court 
emphasized the free speech rights of the audience to receive the 
advertising. 101  The Court stressed that consumers’ interests in 
receiving prescription drug price information was related to “an 
interest in their own health that was ‘fundamentally deeper than a 
                                                
 94  Federal law does protect the privacy of a patient’s health card records 
maintained by health service providers or health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7c(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 95 Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) 
(2012). 
 96 For a statement of how Acxiom, a leading data-mining company, collects 
and markets data about us, see Make Data Work for You, 
https://www.aboutthedata.com, ACXIOM, (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 97 See infra Part III.B. 
 98 Troubling Implications, supra note 75, at 1092 (noting speech about “daily 
life matters” is as important as any other speech). 
 99 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 753 (1976). 
 100 Id. at 753, 770–71. 
 101 Id. 
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trade consideration.’”102 Presumably, the case would have been less 
compelling had the consumers been seeking price information in 
order to comparison shop for shampoos.103 Little in the Supreme 
Court’s original 1976 decision to include commercial speech 
within the protection of the First Amendment justifies the 
extensive speech protections that interactive commuter services 
and social platforms now seek. 
A. Not All Communications Tools Speak 
Some ground clearing is first necessary. Not everything that 
communicates information is speech, even broadly conceived.104 
To take an example offered by constitutional scholar Robert Post, 
navigation charts “communicate” but no court treats them as 
entitled to First Amendment protection. 105  Given the context in 
which they are used, charts function as products or tools subject to 
the normal rules of product liability in cases of inaccuracy.106 For 
example, a blender functions to stir and mix and does not function 
as an expressive piece of glass sculpture. It could be a sculpture 
designed to speak to an individual, but context would point out the 
difference between tool and sculpture. Or to take one of Tim Wu’s 
                                                
 102 Id. at 755 (quoting trial court decision below); id. at 763–764 (“Those 
whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are 
the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged.”). 
 103 Id. at 764 (“[N]ot all commercial messages contain . . . a public interest 
element.”). 
 104 Acts and conduct, and even silence and not doing an act, communicate. As 
communications theorist Paul Watzlawick and colleagues put it, “One cannot 
not communicate.” P. Watzlawick et al., Some Tentative Axioms of 
Communication, in PRAGMATICS OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION - A STUDY OF 
INTERACTIONAL PATTERNS, PATHOLOGIES AND PARADOXES 48–71 (1967). See 
also Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find some 
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, 
walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a 
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 105 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 
1991) (analogizing an aeronautical chart to a compass). 
 106 Robert C. Post, Essay: Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1249, 1254 (1995). 
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examples in Machine Speech, the sound of a car alarm might be 
speech if it were put in a song, but generally the sound functions as 
an automated warning device, not as expressive output for its 
human designer.107 
Similar to Post’s navigation charts, Google Maps or MapQuest 
function as tools for getting from A to B. Obviously, these sites 
process and communicate information sought by users. But users 
do not converse with the map’s designers, as if the designers were 
engaged in conveying some substantive message. 108  If courts 
obliterate this difference between speech and tools that facilitate 
the speech of others, they would be engaging in a new kind of 
“Lochnerizing” in which freedom of speech replaces the old liberty 
of contract as a way to shield commercial enterprises from state 
regulation.109 
B. Not All Raw Data is Speech 
Jane Yakowitz Bambauer is a leading advocate of the position 
that “for all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the 
current debates in information law, data is speech.” 110  For 
Bambauer, “[e]xpanded knowledge is an end goal of American 
                                                
 107 Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1524–25 (2013). 
 108 In Rosenberg v. Harwood, 2011 WL 3153314 (D. Utah 2011), a woman 
sued Google, claiming her reliance on Google Maps led her to step into a 
freeway and suffer an injury. Google defended by citing its free speech rights as 
a publisher. Id. The court did not reach this issue but dismissed the claims on the 
alternative grounds that Google owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. Id. 
 109 For a discussion of how free speech principles can be misused to strike 
down economic regulations in a manner reminiscent of the disapproved Lochner 
era, see infra Part III.C. One example of how the doctrine of commercial speech 
can overextend the First Amendment came in a federal court decision, 
fortunately overturned, striking down the National Do Not Call Registry as an 
unconstitutional infringement on telemarketing. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs. 
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 283 F. Supp. 2d 115, 1167–68 (D. Colo. 2003), 
rev’d, 358 3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2003). Another troubling First Amendment 
decision, one that remains good law, involved the striking down of a regulation 
that forbade telephone companies to use customer data for unauthorized 
advertising purposes. See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F. 3d 1224, 1232–33 
(10th Cir. 1999). 
 110 Bambauer, supra note 93, at 63. 
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speech rights, and accurate information . . . provides the fuel.”111 
Access to raw data is crucial to the creation of new knowledge 
since data is nothing other than “information . . . captured and 
recorded into a fixed, man-made format.”112 It is data that led us to 
revise wrong notions that too much salt causes hypertension113 or 
that stress causes ulcers. 114  For Bambauer, every restriction on 
data’s movement is an obstacle to knowledge and autonomy.115 
Bambauer casts a jaundiced eye at most privacy regulations 
because “they are deliberately designed to disrupt knowledge 
creation.”116 In her view, carefully drafted privacy laws might be 
constitutional, but only if they survive heightened scrutiny under 
the First Amendment. 117  Every privacy restriction raises a 
constitutional objection, many of them fatal. 118  Those privacy 
norms that cannot survive such scrutiny should be “casualties”119 in 
the battle for freedom of information against retrograde forces of 
mind regulation marching under the banner of privacy.120 
However, Bambauer’s analysis bumps into a major problem. 
Although she notes in passing that “knowledge is power,”121 she 
pays scant attention to the “who” of data as opposed to the “what.” 
To those who fret about creditors using Big Data to size up a loan 
applicant, Bambauer’s response, true to the speech answering 
                                                
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 65. 
 113 Id. at 102. 
 114 Id. at 93. 
 115 Id. at 105. 
 116 Id. at 63. 
 117 Id. at 87; id. at 106 (“[D]ata should not be relegated in all cases to a lower 
form of protection.”); id. at 114 (“[G]overnment cannot limit the collection or 
dissemination of data in order to achieve certain preferred ends without a 
compelling interest to do so.”). 
 118 Id. at 109 (recognizing that her analysis “will lead to some consequences 
that are difficult to accept,” including “the leveling of popular consumer privacy 
laws”). 
 119 Id. at 112. 
 120 Id. at 87 (“Data privacy laws have the unabashed goal of limiting, and 
shaping, what the government’s constituents can know.”). 
 121 Id. at 108. 
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speech approach, is that the customer can turn the tables and use 
the same data to shop for creditors.122 This might be true if the 
predicate—that consumers have the same access to Big Data as 
banks—were true for any but the most savvy and credit-worthy of 
consumers. The rest of the consumers live in a world of 
information asymmetry. 123  Even Bambauer acknowledges that 
certain hotel pricing sites know more about visitors—for instance 
whether they use a Mac computer—than visitors know about them, 
and that these sites use their information advantage to steer Mac 
users to more expensive hotels. 124  Bambauer dismisses those 
concerned about such examples as “[t]he equality camp.”125 She 
scoffs at “academic . . . illuminati [who] tend to overreact to 
corporate power” 126  and offers her calming conclusion that “a 
person who is categorized in one instance will be the categorizer in 
the next and will rightly expect the liberty to judge and form his 
own opinions.”127 
One can accept Bambauer’s general view that factual data is 
indispensable to free thought without accepting her specific 
argument that unregulated corporate power over data gathering is 
necessary to, or even always consistent with, fact-driven inquiry.128 
For instance, Robert Post has argued that laws prohibiting the 
                                                
 122 Id. at 102. 
 123 See, e.g., Leah Hunt-Hendrix & Astra Taylor, ‘Tech’ is Political—How We 
Respond to it Needs to be Just as Political, THE NATION (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/tech-political-how-we-respond-it-needs-be-
just-political/. 
 124 Bambauer, supra note 93, at 116; see also Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 245 n.27 (2014) (citing Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, 
Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:07 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023044586045774888226673258
82.html). 
 125 Bambauer, supra note 93, at 107. 
 126 Id. at 108. 
 127 Id. at 102. 
 128  One does not have to cast corporations as the only villains in the 
marketplace of ideas to have concerns about, say, the commitment of tobacco 
companies historically to factual inquiry about the safety of their product. See 
Philip Shenon, New Limits Set Over Marketing for Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
18, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/washington/18tobacco.html. 
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public disclosure of private facts, a tort in most states,129  serve 
rather than hinder the marketplace of ideas by promoting rules of 
civility that permit individuals to engage with one another. 130 
Violations of the rules of civility, Post remarks, are intrinsically 
disrespectful and serve as a way of silencing persons.131 The lack of 
respect places the injured person “outside of the bounds of the 
shared community” and hence outside of participation in public 
speech as an equal.132 
Enforcement of privacy norms is society’s way of reaffirming 
the dignity of the person as a full member of the community.133 Or 
as anthropologist Robert Murphy puts it, “[i]nteraction is 
threatening by definition, and reserve, here seen as an aspect of 
distance, serves to provide partial and temporary protection to the 
self . . . . [The] privacy obtained makes other roles more viable 
. . . .” 134  Privacy lets us know that our personal and intimate 
relationships are secure even as we enter the public arena.135 
Legal scholar Paul Schwartz has raised specific concerns that 
disclosure of a person’s genetic information, however accurate, 
may relegate certain members of society into a “biological 
                                                
 129 See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy 
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L. J. 967, 971–72 (2003). The tort of 
public disclosure of private facts occurs when a person or persons widely 
discloses a private matter that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and 
“is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Id. at 971 (quoting Restatement of 
Torts (Second) § 652D (1977)). 
 130 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in 
the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989). 
 131 Id. at 967. 
 132 Id. at 968. 
 133  Id. at 968, 971 (explaining that common law privacy is a normative 
concept that expresses “forms of respect deemed essential for social life.”). 
 134  Sundquist, supra note 6, at 158 (quoting Robert F. Murphy, Social 
Distance and the Veil, 66 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1257, 1259 (1964)). 
 135 Id. at 173–74; see also Kate Murphy, We Want Privacy, but Can’t Stop 
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2014, at Sunday Review 4 (explaining that being 
under public observation triggers arousal mechanisms that “drain cognitive 
resources [and] . . . inhibit[] . . . our ability to explore our thoughts and feelings 
so we can develop as individuals.”). 
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underclass.”136 Schwartz notes that genetic test results, taken out of 
context, can support a wrong-headed genetic determinism 
characteristic of past eugenics movements.137 And while perhaps 
data can answer data in the emerging market for genetic 
information, “[t]he individual to whom these data refer faces a 
high price when attempting to explain the significance or 
insignificance of the information, and these explanatory costs can 
exceed the value of unrestricted disclosure to society.”138 
In Bambauer’s worldview, almost all data, whether about 
matters of public or private concern, can be useful in the creation 
of knowledge. 139  But, in The Virtues of Knowing Less, law 
professor Daniel Solove builds on the work of Hannah Arendt, 
Erving Goffman, and other scholars to argue that details about our 
intimate and private selves are not necessarily a reliable guide to 
the different selves we all play in public.140 This difference between 
private selves and public lives is crucial to the Supreme Court’s 
sliding scale approach to libel, where the more private the person, 
the greater “the strength of the legitimate state interest in 
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to 
reputation.”141 
Bambauer does accept that individuals have a narrow right to 
privacy that she calls seclusion, which is essentially the right not to 
                                                
 136 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care 
Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1997). 
 137 Id. at 28. 
 138  Id. at 30. Schwartz refers to this as a “cost of explanation” problem 
necessitated in real markets by the less than rational behavior of employers. 
Thus, as opposed to the critiques of privacy as economically inefficient offered 
by leading scholars such as Judge Richard Posner or Richard Epstein, Schwartz 
defends nondisclosure of certain sorts of medical information as economically 
efficient. See id. at 23–30 (summarizing and criticizing the Posner-Epstein 
position on privacy). 
 139 Bambauer, supra note 93, at 63. 
 140 Solove, supra note 129, at 1037–38. 
 141 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974); see also Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) 
(explaining that plaintiffs may recover presumed and punitive damages when 
false and defamatory statements raise no matters of public concern). 
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have information gathering going on inside your house or during 
intimate conversations. 142  But she insists that the geography of 
seclusion be kept narrow, since the farther one is from home, the 
more one is in the ever-expanding grip of “the public.”143 Once we 
use a credit card, we are in the information commons. Thus, one of 
the “casualties” of her narrowing privacy to seclusion would be 
President Obama’s proposed consumer privacy bill of rights for the 
Internet, insofar as that bill talks expansively of “American 
Internet users [] hav[ing] the right to control personal information 
about themselves.”144 
Bambauer is one among many scholars who takes aim at the 
elevation of speech about public affairs over speech about private 
matters.145 In particular, she jettisons any wholesale assignment of 
commercial speech to the lowest levels of First Amendment 
protection.146 For her, such hierarchies empower government to tell 
persons what it is important to know about. Bambauer is 
committed to the notion that all information is created equal. 
C. Data about Prescriptions: The Return of Lochner? 
Consider a recent dispute over the boundaries of commercial 
speech.147 For our purposes, it is serendipitous that the case returns 
to a fact pattern that gave birth to the doctrine of commercial 
speech: information about prescription drugs.148 
                                                
 142 Bambauer, supra note 93, at 111–12. 
 143 Id. at 112 (extending seclusion outside the home has “severe effects on the 
liberty of others”). 
 144 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the 
Internet Age by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb 23. 2012), 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/fact-sheet-
plan-protect-privacy-internet-age-adopting-consumer-privacy-b. 
 145 See, e.g., Troubling Implications, supra note 75, at 1095 (“[T]he public 
concern test is theoretically unsound.”); id. at 1050 (“The difficulty is that the 
right to information privacy - my right to control your communication of 
personally identifiable information about me - is a right to have the government 
stop you from speaking about me.”). 
 146 Bambauer, supra note 93, at 106. 
 147 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 148 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
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Pharmaceutical representatives engage in a marketing practice 
known as “detailing.” 149  Detailers are pharmaceutical 
representatives who obtain from pharmacies or health plans 
detailed information about the prescribing practices of a particular 
physician.150 The detailers then use this information to customize 
their marketing, doctor by doctor.151 
Vermont passed a law that contained three prohibitions on 
access to prescription information.152 The first prohibited entities 
such as pharmacies or health insurers from selling prescriber-
identifying information. 153  The second prohibited these entities 
from disclosing prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes, 
while permitting its use for other purposes.154 The third prohibited 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the information to 
market their products to physicians. 155  Vermont asserted state 
interests in medical privacy and in keeping down health care costs 
by preventing marketers from influencing doctors to prescribe 
expensive brand-name drugs over generic alternatives.156 
The Supreme Court found a fatal flaw in the law.157 Instead of 
enacting a general privacy ban on disclosure of prescriber-
identifying information, the state went after only those sales, 
disclosures, or uses that contained content the state frowned upon 
(marketing) and a disfavored viewpoint (that held by the detailers 
doing the speaking to physicians).158 Since the law violated core 
free speech principles of content and viewpoint neutrality,159 the 
Court subjected the law to more heightened scrutiny than a 
                                                
 149 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 2659–60. 
 152 Id. at 2660; see also VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4631(d) (2015). 
 153 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 154 Id. 
 155  Id. For lucid analysis of the Vermont law, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Constitutional Constraints on State Health Care & Privacy Regulation After 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 855–80 (2012). 
 156 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–71. 
 157 Id. at 2663–64. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 2663–64, 2667. 
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commercial regulation might otherwise have received and struck 
down the law.160 
What if Vermont had passed a more general or neutral ban on 
disclosure of prescriber prescription identification?161 If raw data is 
already speech, as Bambauer maintains, then such a law would 
have to survive heightened scrutiny by convincing the court that 
the privacy interests at stake were compelling and the restrictions 
narrowly tailored to meet those interests. In Sorrell the Court did 
not feel it necessary to reach that issue, since the lack of content 
and viewpoint neutrality was already dispositive of the case. 162 
However, in dicta Justice Kennedy staked out the more speech, the 
better approach that augurs ill for privacy regulations.163  Justice 
Kennedy argued that data about the prescribing habits of 
physicians is factual.164 And “[f]acts . . . are the beginning point for 
much of the speech that is most essential to advance human 
knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong 
argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for 
First Amendment purposes.”165 
If in the future Justice Kennedy’s views move from dicta to 
holding, then we can expect companies in the business of 
monetizing data to push for more free speech protection against 
privacy laws. In Sorrell, the information being disclosed went to 
the doctor’s professional habits, not his personal life or those of 
patients. 166  The Sorrell case left for another day the looming 
question of how to adjust the inherited free speech paradigm of 
“more information is always good” to the marketing of metadata 
that discloses truly personal information.167 
                                                
 160 Id. at 2672. 
 161 The Court specifically noted that such a neutral law would pose different 
questions. Id. at 2668. 
 162 Id. at 2667. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. (emphasis added). 
 166 Id. at 2665, 2668. 
 167 The Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
does protect the privacy of a patient’s health card records maintained by health 	
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In a case from New Hampshire that was similar to Sorrell, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit offered a different analysis of 
data’s claim to First Amendment protection.168 The First Circuit 
regarded the law as a reasonable regulation of the conduct, not the 
speech, of pharmaceutical representatives.169 These representatives 
were engaged in selling prescription drugs just as other 
salespersons were engaged in selling beef jerky.170  The analogy 
was unfortunately flippant, but it illustrated the court’s point that, 
in the context of the case, the data sought served no normative 
purposes that would qualify the information as speech.171 As the 
court put it, the true concern of the pharmaceutical representatives 
was that the market for their services would dry up if they had no 
access to prescriber-identifying data.172 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell picked up on the First Circuit 
approach, going even further by spotting what, following Justice 
Breyer, may be called the Lochner elephant in the room. 173 Ever 
since the New Deal, there has been a more or less stable 
constitutional settlement based on the principle that courts owe 
more deference to legislative regulation of economic affairs than 
                                                                                                         
service providers or health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
However, with the proliferation of software apps run on mobile devices such as 
Fitbit or Apple’s SmartWatch, many persons now store health data in places not 
covered by HIPAA. One wonders whether Bambauer would oppose new privacy 
laws restricting what private vendors can do with personal medical data stored 
on such devices. See Smartwatches and Weak Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
16, 2014, at A26. According to the Wall St. Journal, most of the nearly 40,000 
health apps for wearable devices on the market today make money by selling 
user fitness data to marketers. Elizabeth Dwoskin and Melinda Beck, As Apple 
Moves Into Health Apps, What Happens to Privacy?, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 9, 
2014, 7:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/09/09/as-apple-moves-into-
health-apps-what-happens-to-privacy/. 
 168 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 169 Id. at 45, 50–54. 
 170 Id. at 53. 
 171 Id. at 45, 50–54. 
 172 Id. at 53. 
 173  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2673 (2011) (Breyer, J. 
dissenting). 
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they do to regulations of noneconomic matters.174 But this basic 
distinction collapses when courts characterize state laws regulating 
pharmaceutical marketing as state regulations of speech. 175  The 
Sorrell majority mistakenly reasoned as if Vermont had imposed 
restrictions on what pharmaceutical representatives could say to 
doctors in favor of their message. In fact, the state restricted only 
disclosure of prescriber data that the pharmaceutical companies 
wanted in order to customize their pitches. 176  Against their 
commercial interest stood the state’s significant interests in treating 
that data as private and confidential, given by physicians to 
pharmacies and health insurers for one purpose only.177 The Sorrell 
decision is solicitous of marketing as speech but less attuned to the 
norms of medical practice and how writing a prescription is hardly 
a doctor’s invitation to engage in a dialogue with marketers. In one 
world, doctors “speak” to pharmacists for the benefit of their 
patients only; in another world, doctors as well as patients lose 
control over personal information, as it becomes a commodity to 
be sold and purchased. 
D. The Ever-expanding Bounds of the Public 
Some will respond to the argument in the preceding section by 
objecting that information has always functioned as a tradable 
commodity. Nineteenth century readers thought the penny press 
                                                
 174 The most famous statement of this distinction comes in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 175  “[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon 
commercial messages, the Court’s vision of its reviewing task threatens to return 
us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its 
interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power was much 
abused . . . . See Lochner v. New York . . . .” Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2679 (Breyer, 
J. dissenting). Several commentators have echoed Justice Breyer’s warning that 
the Roberts Court is using freedom of speech in ways similar to the ways the 
infamous Lochner era courts used liberty of contract to strike down commercial 
regulations. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First 
Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1211–17 (2005). 
 176 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662, 2668. 
 177 Id. at 2683 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
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worth the price, if only to get the latest shipping news.178  This 
response is true as far as it goes, but the observation does not go as 
far as supercomputers do in collecting data beyond the bounds of 
anything that was previously possible. 179  Our normative 
commitments to free speech and a free press were never meant to 
cater to a world where the treatment of every disclosure of every 
byte of information as valued speech would be to override the very 
boundaries on public discourse that people rely on in throwing 
themselves into it.180 
Beginning with the work of John Rawls, contemporary theories 
of justice measure the fairness of basic institutions against shared 
principles of public reason. 181  Publicly reasoned arguments are 
those that do not depend on any ultimate moral, religious, or 
spiritual commitments that may matter much to us in private life 
but which cannot be rationally defended to those who believe in 
different ultimate values. 182  However, these theories of justice 
presume that, outside of public deliberations and debates, a private 
realm of speech goes on and flourishes.183 Private discourse does 
not belong in public debates, and publicity should not imperially 
invade our private lives. An ever-expanding notion of what is 
public threatens the realm of the private that democratic theories of 
justice take as a starting point. 
IV. TOO MUCH SPEECH FOR SEARCH ENGINES? 
In 2003, Search King, a small advertising placement company, 
alleged that Google deliberately lowered Search King’s Google 
rankings as a way to kill off ad competition. 184  Search King’s 
                                                
 178 For the history of the penny press see MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING 
THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 12–60 (1978). 
 179 See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text. 
 180 See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
 181 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 397–98 (1999). 
 182 Id. 
 183 See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 148 (Penguin, 
1977). 
 184 Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 
(2003). 
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business model was to locate web sites highly ranked by Google 
and pay these sites to link with its clients’ webpages, thereby 
raising the Google rankings of its clients’ pages. 185  As the 
middleman that grew these “link farms,” Search King profited.186 
Google guards against such “search optimization” firms, regarding 
them as attempts to game the system.187 When its Google ranking, 
as well as those of its partnered sites, suddenly declined, Search 
King found its business model threatened.188 
A. Search Engines as Opinion Speakers 
In moving successfully to dismiss the complaint, Google 
argued that it did not matter what its reasons were for ranking 
Search King and the partnered sites as it did.189 After all, Google 
maintained, its search results were just its opinions about the 
relative worth of websites when it came to providing answers to a 
user’s query.190 The rankings, like any ratings, were neither true nor 
false, but a classic example of protected speech—a speaker (here 
the algorithm) publishing its opinions about a matter of public 
interest.191 Given Google’s First Amendment status as an opinion 
                                                
 185  Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1327, 1354–55 
(2008). 
 186 James Grimmelmann, Google Replies to Search King Lawsuit, LawMeme 
(Jan. 9, 2004), http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name= 
News&file=article&sid=807, available at http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20040612081746/research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=a
rticle&sid=807. 
 187 For an analysis of use of search-engine optimization techniques to “game” 
the system, see, e.g., Heather Lloyd-Martin, Secrets of Successful Search Engine 
Optimization, (March 5, 2003), http://searchenginewatch.com/sew/news/ 
2047911/secrets-successful-search-engine-optimization#. 
 188 Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 at 3–4. 
 189 Id. at 6, 13. 
 190 Id. at 6; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1445, 1477 (2013) (noting search results express opinions as to a 
webpage’s usefulness or quality). 
 191 In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had held that “a statement of opinion 
relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false 
factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.” Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990). 
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speaker, a trial would be pointless, Google argued, since there was 
no such thing as evidence that could prove a mere opinion true or 
false, objective or biased.192 The trial judge agreed, going so far as 
to state that an algorithm’s rankings “cannot be considered 
wrongful even if the speech is motivated by hatred or ill will.”193 
Other courts have reached similar conclusions in extending 
traditional protections for opinion to the evaluations contained in 
Google search results.194 In testimony before Congress, Google’s 
CEO, Eric Schmidt, said, “[s]earch is subjective, and there’s no set 
of ‘correct’ search results.”195 One court has alternatively protected 
Google by holding that free speech principles protect the company 
from being compelled to speak by indexing any particular 
website.196 Google continues to take action against other alleged 
search optimization schemes by deliberately lowering their 
ranks.197 
                                                
 192 Google argued for dismissal of the complaint since “[t]he PageRank values 
assigned by Google are not susceptible to being proved true or false by objective 
evidence. How could SearchKing ever ‘prove’ that its ranking should ‘truly’ be 
a 4 or a 6 or a 8? Certainly, SearchKing is not suggesting that each one of the 
billions of web pages ranked by Google are [sic] subject to another ‘truer’ 
evaluation? If it believes so, it is certainly free to develop its own search 
services using the criteria it deems most appropriate.” Amy N. Langville and 
Carl D. Meyer, GOOGLE’S PAGERANK AND BEYOND: THE SCIENCE OF SEARCH 
ENGINE RANKINGS 53 (Princeton 2011). 
 193 Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27193 at *13. 
 194 Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 439–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(noting Chinese search engine has First Amendment right to block “pro-
democracy” sites as exercise of editorial judgment); Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 231, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding online poster’s comments, 
“while unquestionably offensive,” were “pure opinion” and hence “were not 
actionable under [state] defamation law.”); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, 
Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *20–*21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 
2007) (“Google itself holds out PageRank as an opinion . . . .”). 
 195 Testimony quoted in James Grimmelmann, Search Engines, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 868, 872, n. 16 (2014). 
 196 Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007) (holding 
the First Amendment protects Google’s right not to run a website’s ads). 
 197 See Josh Blackman, What Happens if Data is Speech? 16 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 25, 30 (2014) (recounting Google’s decision first to demote then to reinstate 	
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Control over search rankings matters to the free flow of 
information, since a site that does not get indexed by a search 
engine might as well not exist.198 There is such a dramatic drop off 
from clicks on sites displayed on page one of search results 
compared to clicks on page two sites that companies fear being 
exiled into digital Siberia.199 
In the U.S., decisions such as Search King make it difficult 
even to reach questions about possible bias in search engine 
rankings. Once a court categorizes these rankings as opinions, the 
protections of the First Amendment shelter search engines from 
regulatory oversight of the content of their speech. And yet, the 
analogy of algorithmic output to opinion speech is tenuous. At 
most, the opinion of the algorithm is something weak like “We 
think these are the sites you will find most useful to answer your 
query.” 200  This is a far cry from Google offering its own 
substantive opinion about the content of the sites indexed. 
Google’s service seems more like a tool without any opinions of its 
own, an index useful to persons engaged in speech activity of their 
own.201 
In a white paper commissioned by Google, Eugene Volokh and 
Donald Falk follow the lead of the Search King decision by folding 
                                                                                                         
the rankings of a website on rap lyrics suspected of using improper search 
optimization techniques). 
 198  Id. at 29–30 (“[Google’s] ability to immediately and pervasively 
‘disappear’ a site is significant. If you don’t play by the rules, your ranking can 
be destroyed, and you are effectively invisible.”); see also Oren Bracha & Frank 
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission: Access, Fairness, and Accountability in 
the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1150, 1165–66 (2008). 
 199 See Lastowka, supra note 185, at 1342 (stating that the average user rarely 
travels beyond first page of results); Bracha and Pasquale, supra note 198, at 
1165 (citing to sources that find a drop off in users already occurring for the site 
listed second rather than first). 
 200 See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 190, at 1461. 
 201 I take this distinction between speech and communication tools from Wu, 
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Google Search into the inherited legal protections of opinion.202 
They do so by drawing an analogy between the first page of search 
results and the first page of a traditional print newspaper. Just as 
newspapers select stories important enough to appear on page one, 
so search engines crawl through web pages to select the most 
useful answers to a query, displaying the top ones on its equivalent 
first page of results. 203  But, as Tim Wu argues, the analogy is 
misleading. A newspaper publishes stories as its own speech 
product, written by their reporters or selected by editors to appear 
as a story whose content the newspaper stands by.204 By contrast, 
Google does not endorse the results it indexes or claim that Google 
is speaking through these websites.205 
Even if one accepted that search engines offer opinions, the 
opinions at issue could still be demonstrably false or biased. Here 
James Grimmelmann’s distinction between normative and 
descriptive opinions is helpful.206 A search engine’s display of top 
results to a query is a normative opinion, insofar as it depends on a 
host of subjective factors about how to compare the utility of sites, 
but the displayed list also purports to be a true description of what 
the search engine found, applying its own subjective criteria.207 
Normative opinions are not falsifiable, but descriptive opinions 
are. Descriptive opinions are false when they are dishonest.208 They 
are dishonest when they do not accurately report what the search 
engine’s subjective process actually retrieved. 
Given how closely guarded the secret of a search engine 
algorithm is, outsiders are not in a good position to judge whether 
outputs are never, ever, frequently, or rarely dishonest in this 
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sense.209 Yet search companies go out of their way to calm public 
fears by abandoning courtroom emphasis on the subjectivity of 
results in favor of public pronouncements about the honesty of 
search. Google, on its “Technology Overview” page of 2004, 
specifically assured users that “‘[t]here is no human involvement 
or manipulation of results, which is why users have come to trust 
Google as a source of objective information . . . .”’210 Google went 
on to underscore its commitment “‘to providing thorough and 
unbiased search results.’”211 The wording is different today but the 
message is the same.212 
B. Search Engines as Indexers 
There is considerable irony in these statements from Google. 
Although it claims in some cases that it is a classic opinion speaker 
entitled to heightened First Amendment protection, Google turns to 
an alternative and contradictory description of the search business 
when the case calls for it. Search engines suddenly stop speaking 
and become mere conduits for locating what a user wants. They 
function as automated intermediaries bringing together the 
questions of users and the answers found on web pages. 213  In 
lawsuits seeking to hold Google liable for objectionable content on 
indexed sites, continued insistence on search engines having their 
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own opinions might lead to undesirable results for the company.214 
For this reason, Google re-describes the business of search in 
purely functional terms, abandoning claims for being a message 
giver in favor of being a neutral medium that matches the 
questions and answers of others. 
Permitting Google to toggle back and forth between First 
Amendment rationales is one telling sign of the too much speech 
era. The speech interests of users and web publishers are not well 
served when Google can set up one First Amendment shield to 
protect it against allegations of bias (such as “we are entitled to 
express our opinion”) and another to gain immunity for any harm 
to reputation or privacy (such as “we express no opinion about the 
content of the indexed sites”).215   
C. Search Engine Bias 
As graduate students, Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry 
Page disparaged “advertising funded search engines” as 
“inherently . . . biased towards the advertisers and away from the 
needs of the consumers.” 216  They pejoratively had in mind the 
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search engine that would auction off top rankings to the highest 
bidder, as if how much a company was willing to pay to be the first 
result displayed in response to a query about “asbestos exposure” 
was a good way of determining relevance. Such a protocol would 
probably elevate plaintiff litigation firms to the top.217 To avoid 
bias, Brin and Page set out to devise a search engine that would 
determine the relative utility of websites through a non-advertiser 
driven process.218 
In the end, Google devised a spectacularly successful search 
algorithm that managed to appeal to both users and advertisers.219 
As Page put it in 2006, “[t]he economic success we continue to 
enjoy is the direct result of our ability to marry our user experience 
to the information that advertisers want to communicate.” 220 
Although the graphics of how Google displays search results have 
changed over time, Google has always distinguished displays that 
are purchased by advertisers versus rankings that result from the 
automatic workings of the search algorithm. 221 
For the non-advertiser results, Google’s key breakthrough was 
to tie judgments of a particular website’s usefulness to how often 
other highly ranked websites linked to or referred to that website.222 
The more highly ranked a website was that linked to a page to be 
ranked, the more weight Google gave to its vote of confidence.223 
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In other words, a website could rise through the ranks through a 
decentralized process of peer review. The most popular web pages, 
as judged by links to them, climb to the top of the pyramid.224 
However, a number of factors could bias the apparent 
democracy of peer review, including: (1) manual or ad-hoc 
manipulation of search rankings to favor Google’s own 
subsidiaries, such as YouTube or Google Play;225 (2) structural bias 
built into an algorithm purposely designed to favor majority 
preferences—a design that frequently will favor well-established 
and well-financed sites;226 and (3) ability of wealthier companies to 
“game the system” by using search optimization techniques to 
inflate their ratings.227 Some commentators respond that any bias in 
the search engine business would be self-correcting, since 
dissatisfied users would migrate to other search engines.228  But 
Google faces only weak competition in the U.S. and European 
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markets229 and competitors face an uphill battle as Google has such 
a head start at developing the necessary infrastructure.230 
After receiving numerous allegations of search engine bias, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched an antitrust 
investigation of Google in 2012.231 The major allegation was that 
Google used its dominance in the search market to favor its 
subsidiaries over competitors. An FTC staff report recommended 
filing antitrust charges, finding that Google’s “conduct has 
resulted—and will result—in real harm to consumers and to 
innovation in the online search and advertising markets.” 232 
However, in the end, the FTC issued a “no action” letter, finding 
insufficient evidence that Google manipulated searches to stifle 
competition. 233  While Google “took aggressive actions to gain 
advantage over rival search providers,” the commissioners found 
the company did so without breaking any applicable laws.234 Calls 
for legal reform went unheeded after Google agreed to alter some 
of its practices.235 
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In Europe, regulators have long been suspicious of Google’s 
market dominance.236  On April 15, 2015, the European Union’s 
competition commissioner filed formal antitrust allegations against 
the company, alleging that the company diverts search traffic from 
competitors’ shopping sites to Google’s own shopping sites.237 
The problem with search is not that we have too much of it. 
Rather, this section has argued that Google and other search 
engines receive too much First Amendment protection, to the point 
where the fairness of search results must be taken on trust. There 
may be good reasons for this trust, but it is never safe to permit a 
single company to be so dominant in a particular medium of 
speech (“search”) that we cannot even examine whether its 
channels are fairly open to all. Courts make it difficult even to 
examine issues of bias by treating search algorithms as classic 
opinion speakers. Even if we were to concede that search results 
are subjective, there remains an important difference between 
transparent and deceptive search practices that the First 
Amendment should not prohibit consumers and competitors from 
examining. 
V. SEARCHING FOR REPUTATION 
The very idea of searching for someone’s reputation would 
once have seemed odd. A person’s reputation used to depend on 
what people who actually knew her, or at least who knew other 
people who knew her, thought about her. Search engines vastly 
enlarged the sources of information about a person, arguably 
representing a great victory for “the more speech the better.” At 
least the promise was that online reputations would be more 
accurate, more information driven, more the product of many 
sources and globally accessible to all.238 Critics respond that online 
reputations are just as likely to be stale, out-of-date, and based on 
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information taken out of context.239 They lament the lack of due 
process for anyone who claims harm from stories that search 
engines locate, migrate, and perpetuate.240 
In 2014, the highest court in Europe entered the too much 
speech, too little reputation debate on the side of reputation.241 
Relying on EU privacy directives,242 Mario Costeja Gonzalez of 
Spain sought to have Google remove links to online articles 
detailing debts he once had in 1998 that led to the attachment and 
public auction of some of his property.243 The stories were true and 
based on public records.244 Mr. Gonzalez had retired the debt and 
yet, to borrow a term from school days, the black mark remained 
part of his permanent record. Drawing on EU statutory law, the 
ECJ ruled that persons enjoy a right to have information about 
them “forgotten” in circumstances where the harm to reputation 
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outweighed any public benefit gained from the information.245 The 
Spaniard, the court ruled, was entitled to have Google remove links 
to the original 1998 article, since he had discharged the debt and 
the continual linking to that story no longer served any public 
purpose.246 
Like most courts, the ECJ drew on the concept of privacy as 
the most fully developed legal tool available. However, the court 
was aware that the case did not quite fit within privacy. 247  In 
referring to a right to have information “forgotten,” the ECJ 
struggled to articulate the distinct harm to dignity and reputation.248 
The harm occurred not with the original public disclosure of the 
Spaniard’s debt troubles but with the persistence of the story over 
time. With the rise of search engines, an old story from 1998 in 
one Spanish newspaper’s online archive is republished and 
transmitted globally to anyone searching under Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez’s name. 
Unfortunately, the ECJ left the scope of the right to have 
information forgotten overly vague. It did not provide guidance as 
to when a story becomes old or irrelevant enough to be forgotten.249 
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The court did not even defend its specific conclusion that the 1998 
story about the Spaniard’s debts was for some reason within the 
right to forget. As law and economics scholar Judge Richard 
Posner noted in another context, complaints of the Spaniard’s sort 
might amount to nothing more than a self-interested attempt to 
misrepresent oneself in public, to the disadvantage of others.250 
Professor Richard Epstein takes a similar position, arguing that 
“when a major change in personal or financial status is 
contemplated by another party, the white lies that make human 
interaction possible turn into frauds of a somewhat deeper dye.”251 
In sum, the ECJ decision left unanswered the question of 
whether its decision would lead to a dumbed-down web, carrying 
only purged versions of past personal histories. The court did not 
address the potentially crippling burden placed on data providers to 
monitor what should be deleted, when it should be deleted, and 
from where it should be deleted.252 From Google’s perspective, the 
ECJ’s ruling threatened the very survival of a borderless Internet.253 
If and when other regions of the world follow Europe in imposing 
their own local rules on what needs to be forgotten, then search 
companies would be under multiple and conflicting obligations.254 
For all its flaws, a right to have search engines forget about 
past stories does have appeal as a way to restore to individuals the 
power to shape and reshape their reputations. In the U.S., public 
opinion polls suggest a broad consensus that individuals should be 
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able to delete or erase some private information. 255  In Europe, 
during the five months immediately following the ECJ decision, 
Google received approximately 143,000 requests from individuals 
asking the company to take down links to allegedly stale 
information. 256  Google granted about half of those. 257  Fear of 
penalties might motivate Google to err on the side of granting 
requests. But it could be that even Google is finding the equities to 
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favor less information about individuals, not more, which would 
indicate a rare instance of a retreat from the more speech, the better 
approach by which the Internet lives. 
Two stories illustrate why some reform along the lines of a 
right to be forgotten is necessary. The first story is a slight and silly 
episode, the second horrible and heartbreaking. 
In his book, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital 
Age, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger opens with the following story.258 
A college student enrolled in a teacher certification program posted 
to a social networking site a photograph of her in a pirate hat 
holding a glass above the caption, “Drunken Pirate.” 259  Even 
though she successfully completed all coursework, her university 
refused to grant her a teacher certificate after being notified by a 
supervisor who had seen the photograph and considered it 
unprofessional behavior. 260  The student wanted the photograph 
forgotten, but her attempt to delete the photo was idle.261 The social 
networking site did permit her to delete the photograph on her own 
page but by then it lived other lives on other sites not controlled by 
the former student. 262  In Internet language, the information had 
washed downstream. 
It could be argued that the student consented to making the 
photograph public by posting it in the first place, that she knew or 
should have known how the Internet works.263 To be sure, this case 
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goes beyond what the concept of privacy can illumine, since the 
student publicly shared the photograph. The deeper issue is akin to 
the problem about forgetting that the ECJ grappled with in the case 
of the Spaniard’s retired debt. At what point do the “drunken 
pirate” moments get forgotten and forgiven? Who has the power to 
decide when the photograph’s online presence should expire and 
on what grounds of relevance, age, or other criteria? 
These are questions that cannot sensibly be asked within the 
more speech, the better paradigm. The very notion that true 
information “expires” seems to be a contradiction in terms, as if 
data are like clothes that go out of style or truth is of limited 
duration. But Mayer-Schonberger, a leading critic of our too much 
speech world, sets out to defend the counterintuitive notion that too 
much remembering and too little forgetting is harmful to the 
human learning condition.264 Out of time or context,265 information 
bytes form online reputations controlled by anonymous “click 
voting” for the story that appeals to many who might never have 
met the person in the flesh. These artificial reputations stick to a 
person, thanks to the permanence of digital memory. For every 
web page that disappears, a copy of the original material springs up 
elsewhere.266 Online stories from the past remain front and center, 
regardless of the trajectory of a person’s real life past the time 
when the information was originally stored.267 
                                                                                                         
irrelevance” on the only platforms that will matter. ERIC SCHMIDT AND JARED 
COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: TRANSFORMING NATIONS, BUSINESSES AND 
OUR LIVES 33 (2013). 
 264 MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra note 19, at 92–128. 
 265  “In most cases, a high position on popular search engines . . . adds 
legitimacy and reliability to a statement or source. A statement, which in its 
original context, would not be relied upon as fact may be relied upon as fact if 
reproduced and displayed prominently in a particular search query.” Durkee, 
supra note 32, at 804–05, n.172. 
 266 Ambrose, supra note 18, at 372. 
 267 “When intimate personal information circulates among a small group of 
people who know us well, its significance can be weighed against other aspects 
of our personality and character. By contrast, when intimate information is 
removed from its original context and revealed to strangers, we are vulnerable to 	
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Where the first story seems almost a parody of those who think 
there can be no such thing as too much speech, the second story is 
somber. In the second story, the harm caused to a grieving family 
was neither to reputation nor to privacy since the photographs they 
wanted removed from the Internet were never theirs. The harm was 
to the basic respect and dignity a family is owed after the death of 
their daughter.268 
In 2006, an eighteen-year old woman was decapitated in a car 
accident. 269  Employees of the California Highway Patrol 
improperly emailed crime scene photographs to friends and the 
pictures of the decapitated woman began circulating on the 
Internet, eventually turning up on numerous websites, replicating 
like a malignant virus. 270  Here was a situation where the 
information had no public value; those leaking it said they did so 
only for the photo’s “shock value.”271 Distraught and worried that 
their three surviving children might see the pictures, the parents 
forbade them to go online and began, to no avail, to seek to have 
Google and other search engines remove links to the photos.272 But 
there was nothing akin to the European right to forget available to 
them.273 
From the moral point of view, there was no information benefit 
to the photographs’ presences online that could possibly justify the 
harm to the family. Yet the family was legally powerless to 
demand the removal of the photographs.274 Individual websites or 
platforms, at their discretion, could remove the material. But when 
the items went viral, this was no solution. A search for the 
photographs might return a message that a website containing the 
                                                                                                         
being misjudged on the basis of our most embarrassing, and therefore most 
memorable, tastes and preferences.” ROSEN, supra note 239, at 8. 
 268 For an account of this story, see Toobin, supra note 213, at 26–32. 
 269 Id. at 26. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. at 32. 
 274 The family did win a civil damage suit against the California Highway 
Patrol for the leak of the photos to the media. Id. 
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photographs no longer existed, but the search engine would move 
on to link to the next of the sites to which the photographs had 
migrated.275 
A case such as this shows why the ECJ decision, for all its 
problems, is groundbreaking. Against Google’s protests, the ECJ 
rightly ruled that search engines effectively control the availability 
of material online276 and hence should not be able to disown all 
responsibility for the links they give out.277 
VI. TOO MUCH SPEECH, TOO MUCH SURVEILLANCE 
Government surveillance would seem to be a counter-example 
to my thesis that we live in a world of too much speech. After all, 
one would think that surveillance would chill people from 
speaking or being spoken to in the first place. But too much speech 
and too much surveillance strangely go together. This unexpected 
convergence may be the greatest threat to free speech that we face. 
Few persons reject the legitimacy of some amount of 
government surveillance in an age of global terrorism. 278  The 
sticking point is whether surveillance policies will be decided 
democratically, with as much public disclosure and public debate 
as security concerns permit, 279  or will fear of terrorism pervert 
                                                
 275 Id. at 26. For the short life of some web pages, see Ambrose, supra note 
18, at 372. 
 276 See Blackman, supra note 197, at 30 (noting sites not indexed by a search 
engine might as well not exist). 
 277 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. ___, ¶28, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065. 
 278 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[E]veryone, 
including this Court, agrees [the prevention of terrorist attacks] is ‘of the highest 
order of magnitude.’”). 
 279  Compare David Frum, We Need More Secrecy: Why Government 
Transparency Can Be an Enemy of Liberty, THE ATLANTIC (May 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/05/we-need-more-
secrecy/359820/, with Nancy L. Rosenblum, Governing Beyond Imagination: 
The “World Historical” Sources of Democratic Dysfunction, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
649, 657–60 (2014). 
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democracy into an odd justification for subjecting everyone to a 
secret policy of all search all the time? 
A. The Democratization of Surveillance 
While open information comes in with the democratic tide, 
even democracies feel the pull of authoritarian information policies 
in an age of terrorism. The very digital technologies that 
underwrite the expansion of speech also provide government with 
more capacity for surveillance of speech. 280  In the era of 
investigative journalism that began roughly with Watergate, there 
was little the government could do to use the facilities of the New 
York Times or the Washington Post to monitor leaks of classified 
information to these newspapers. 281 What has changed is that the 
NSA is in a position to use, and does use, “the new press”—the 
advances in the infrastructure of communication provided by the 
internet service providers and platforms—to gather up, store and 
analyze what is being said through these facilities. 282  The 
government does this through a combination of methods, 
sometimes involving voluntary compliance from the tech giants283 
                                                
 280 See Neil M. Richards, Symposium, Privacy and Technology: The Dangers 
of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (2013) (“The same digital 
technologies that have revolutionized our daily lives . . . have also created ever 
more detailed records about those lives.”). 
 281 I owe this observation to Balkin, supra note 31, at 2297–98. 
 282 See Richards, supra note 280, at 1936. 
 283 See infra notes 285 and 323 and accompanying text for controversy over 
how much voluntary compliance there has been. In 2010, WikiLeaks released 
video footage of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It followed this by 
releasing to news organizations a sample of classified State Department cables. 
In response, the U.S. government mounted a campaign to enlist the help of 
electronics communications companies in shutting the site down. It succeeded in 
getting the registration company that directs users to the domain name, 
“wikileaks.org,” to cease service, so that users who searched for the site came up 
with nothing. Amazon ceased hosting WikiLeaks on its cloud computing 
service, Apple removed an iPhone app that provided access to information 
WikiLeaks had posted online. PayPal and other payment services ceased 
providing service for WikiLeaks. See Benkler, supra note 8, at 340–44 (noting 
that none of these companies were legally compelled to act against WikiLeaks, 
though considerable pressure was brought on them to do so). On the other hand, 
Google and Twitter did not fully cooperate with the efforts to shut down 	
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while other times compelling disclosure, 284  though this is not 
without resistance.285 
As Neil Richards puts it, the novelty of contemporary 
surveillance is that corporate monitoring and government 
surveillance have become “related parts of the same problem.”286 If 
it were not for the trove of personal data about consumers, 
government would not be in a position to monitor our political 
activities quite as well. 287  Or as Balkin suggests, the 
“democratization of information” includes the democratization of 
surveillance, as routine, daily data collection on virtually all of us 
becomes a standard method of tracing patterns that may uncover a 
plot or crime by someone else.288 
One example of the convergence of government surveillance 
and corporate gathering of personal data was the program at issue 
in the 2006 case, Gonzales v. Google.289 To buttress its defense of 
                                                                                                         
WikiLeaks. See Yochai Benkler, WikiLeaks and the Protect-IP Act: A New 
Public-Private Threat to the Internet Commons, 140 DAEDALUS 154, 158 
(2011). 
 284 In 2013, the Justice Department secretly subpoenaed two months of phone 
records of various Associated Press reporters to investigate an AP story 
revealing classified information on a foiled Al Qaeda plot. See Sari Horwitz, 
Under Sweeping Subpoenas, Justice Department Obtained AP Phone Records in 




 285 Recently released documents from a 2008 federal court case show the 
extent of Yahoo’s resistance to complying with government subpoenas for 
customer information. See Vindu Goel & Charlie Savage, Threat of Daily Fine 
Shows Government’s Aggressive Push for Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014 at 
B1. 
 286 Richards, supra note 280, at 1935. 
 287 In recognition of this problem, Apple announced in 2014 that its iOS8 
operating system on the latest generation of iPhones “was designed so that it’s 
not technically feasible for us to respond to government warrants for the 
extraction of . . . data from devices . . . running iOS 8.” Privacy-Government 
Requests, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/government-information-
requests/ (last visited Aug., 25, 2015). 
 288 Balkin, supra note 31, at 2297. 
 289 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
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the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act of 1998,290 
the government subpoenaed evidence from search companies 
about the availability of indecent material on the Internet. It first 
sought “all” URLs indexed by the search engines, then a sample of 
a million, and finally settled on 50,000. It also sought the texts of 
all search queries entered during a two-month period, eventually 
narrowing the request down to 5,000 queries.291 Google objected 
and eventually persuaded a federal court judge to block the request 
for texts of search queries and to scale back considerably the 
number of URL addresses to be turned over.292 Still, in the end the 
government gained use of Google’s information infrastructure in 
ways that government could never have used the facilities of the 
New York Times. 
1. The NSA and Snowden Files: Telephone Monitoring 
In 2013, definitive evidence of the NSA’s secret phone data 
gathering operation came to light through former agency contractor 
Edward Snowden’s leaks to the British newspaper, The 
Guardian.293  The NSA operation centered on the collection and 
storage of virtually all telephone numbers dialed from or to a 
United States phone customer, for possible analysis to links to 
phone numbers linked to known or suspected terrorists. 294  The 
program did not involve the NSA listening in to any 
conversations.295 
                                                
 290 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2012). 
 291 Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 678–79. 
 292 Id. at 688. 
 293  See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of 
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order. 
 294 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14–19 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 
Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 15189 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 295  Id. On June 1, 2015, the NSA telephone metadata program came to a 
temporary halt when Congress failed to extend statutory authority for it. Carl 
Hulse, Bluff Called, McConnell Misplays His Hand in Phone Data Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2015, at A13. The next day, Congress approved a modified 
surveillance program where phone data would remain in the possession of the 
phone companies, but available to the NSA upon obtaining warrants from the 	
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To date, four federal courts have ruled on the legality of the 
program. In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Richard Leon of the 
District of Columbia Circuit found the NSA’s collection of bulk 
telephone data to be an unconstitutional infringement on Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches.296 However, in 
ACLU v. Clapper, Judge William Pauley III of the Second Circuit 
upheld the constitutionality of the program, finding that phone 
users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers 
they dial.297 
On appeal, both the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated 
these respective district court decisions.298 However, neither court 
reached the constitutional issues of speech and privacy that are the 
concern of this Article.299 The Second Circuit ruled only that the 
NSA lacked statutory authority to engage in bulk collection of 
phone records.300 The court left open the issue of whether clear 
Congressional authorization of such a program would be 
constitutional.301 In the D.C. Circuit, a three-judge panel vacated 
Judge Leon’s decision in Klayman but remanded the case to the 
trial court for further proceedings that would give the plaintiffs an 
opportunity to uncover evidence during discovery that their own 
phone records were among those turned over to the NSA.302 
                                                                                                         
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268, 
269–77 (2015) (to be codified at 50 U. S. C. § 1861); see also Michael D. Shear, 
In Pushing for Revised Surveillance Program, Obama Strikes His Own Balance, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2015, at A14. 
 296 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 7, 30–32. 
 297 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 
785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 298 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 820–22; Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S. 
App. Lexis 15189, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2015). 
 299 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821, n.12; Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S. 
App. Lexis 15189 at *1–*4, 11, 22. 
 300 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821. 
 301 Id. at 824–25. 
 302 Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 15189. One judge found that the 
plaintiffs had shown a probability that their own phone records were among 
those collected by the NSA but had not shown a substantial likelihood of 	
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Since neither court of appeals reached the constitutional issues 
addressed in this Article,303 District Judge Leon’s vacated decision 
is still worthy of serious analysis. Of particular note, this section 
will argue, is Judge Leon’s argument that Fourth Amendment law 
on privacy must evolve to keep up with the evolution of 
surveillance technology in this era of too much speech. 
Judge Leon began by comparing the government’s “old” style, 
occasional surveillance of specific phone conversations to the 
NSA’s post 9/11 secret program for automatically collecting bulk 
data on the phone calls of millions of Americans.304 In the 1979 
case, Smith v. Maryland,305 the Supreme Court ruled that the police 
did not need a warrant to install a pen register306 on the phone of a 
particular criminal suspect, since no one has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.307 Telephone users 
voluntarily transmit this information to telephone companies, 
knowing that they become part of the telephone companies’ 
business records.308 In defending the NSA bulk data collection, the 
government cited this case as the controlling precedent. 309 
However, the judge disagreed.310 In Smith, the phone monitoring 
                                                                                                         
ultimately prevailing on the merits. Id. at 6 (Brown, J.). He voted to remand the 
case to the trial court, where further discovery might uncover evidence that their 
phone records were among those collected by the NSA. Id. at 10–11. A second 
judge found the plaintiffs had not even established standing to sue. Nevertheless, 
he joined in the decision to remand in order to give the plaintiffs an opportunity 
to establish standing. Id. at 23–24 (Williams, J.). 
 303 Although the Second Circuit decided Clapper solely on statutory grounds, 
it did offer remarks on the constitutional issues for the guidance of the trial court 
upon remand. The court described the constitutional concerns as “vexing,” 
“serious,” and “daunting.” ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821, 824–25. 
 304 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 7, 30–32. 
 305 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 306 A pen register is a small device that records phone numbers dialed. 
 307  Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. Subsequent to Smith, Congress enacted the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, requiring judicial 
approval of the installation of pen registers. 
 308 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–44. 
 309 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31. 
 310 Id. at 30–32. In ACLU v. Clapper, 957 F. Supp. 2d. 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013), the district judge reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Smith was 	
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was of a particular person suspected of making threatening calls. In 
the NSA program, the agency routinely collected phone logs of 
millions of Americans suspected of nothing, in the hopes of mining 
the bulk data for leads to suspicious activity. 311  In Smith, the 
surveillance lasted only a matter of days and data was not retained. 
In the NSA case, the bulk collection of data was ongoing and the 
agency showed every intention of maintaining its growing database 
“for as long as America is combatting terrorism.”312 
Finally, and most importantly for the judge, the relation 
between phone companies and government had dramatically 
changed from 1979 to 2013. In 1979, there was no formalized 
agreement between the two to conduct phone surveillance; rather, 
in 1979 there was only phone company cooperation with a criminal 
investigation targeted at a particular individual.313 But, the judge 
continued, today’s citizens certainly did not expect what the 
Snowden files revealed, that the government and phone companies 
were operating “what is effectively a joint intelligence-gathering 
operation.”314 
                                                                                                         
still controlling and that persons had no privacy interest in dialed numbers in the 
possession of a third party (the phone company). In vacating the district court 
decision on other grounds, the Second Circuit described the Supreme Court’s 
privacy jurisprudence since Smith as “in some turmoil” and expressed sympathy 
for the argument that the movement of mass amounts of personal data onto 
mobile phones casts doubt on the continuing applicability of Smith to modern 
technologies. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821–822 (2d Cir. 2015). One 
commentator predicts that “[t]he third party doctrine will be dismantled soon, 
and for good reason,” noting that “the sweeping collection programs brought to 
light by Snowden’s leaks have reinvigorated the push to abandon it.” Jane 
Bambauer, Data, Police, and the Whole Constitution 4 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 311 The government defended its bulk collection of call logs by citing their use 
in foiling three imminent terrorist attacks. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 40–41. 
But the judge concluded that none of the episodes involved the kind of urgency 
that might justify warrantless surveillance. Id. The district judge in Clapper 
reached the opposite conclusion. ACLU v. Clapper, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 755–56. 
 312 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
 313 Id. at 32–33. 
 314 Id. at 33. 
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The judge drew this controversial, and probably overstated, 
conclusion from the government’s own description of the NSA 
bulk phone data program as one where “certain 
telecommunications service providers . . . produce to the NSA on a 
daily basis electronic copies of call detail records, or telephony 
metadata.” 315  The existence of such a formalized policy was a 
major factor in the judge’s finding that “the relationship between 
the NSA and telecom companies [had] become so thoroughly 
unlike those considered by the Supreme Court” in 1979 as to make 
the Smith precedent inapplicable.316 
In issuing, but staying, a preliminary injunction against the 
NSA telephony collection, the judge cited the changes in 
Americans’ telephone habits that made telephone records of such 
interest to the NSA. Here the problem of too much speech came to 
the fore. Mobile devices, principally smartphones, have morphed 
into ubiquitous, multi-purpose tools. Telephone “[r]ecords that 
once would have revealed a few scattered tiles of information 
about a person now reveal an entire mosaic—a vibrant and 
constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”317 
2. The NSA and Snowden Files: Electronic Monitoring 
In addition to revealing the NSA collection of phone logs, 
Snowden leaked information about a “Special Sources Operation” 
                                                
 315 Id. at 32 (emphasis added by the trial judge). 
 316 Id. at 31. The judge characterized the cooperation between government and 
telecom companies as amounting to a joint enterprise since the companies were 
turning over bulk data on a routine, daily basis. However, this does not mean 
that the companies were cooperating voluntarily or that government somehow 
had a technological back door into company servers, as has sometimes been 
reported. For the back door rumors, see infra Part VI.A.2. 
 317 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (citation omitted). In a prior case, the 
Supreme Court similarly emphasized that Fourth Amendment law has to change 
with the technology. In holding that the police need a warrant before searching a 
suspect’s cellphone, Justice Roberts emphasized how much more personal 
information a person carries on a smartphone than persons could have carried on 
their person before. Failure to see how the smartphone has revolutionized 
communications would be analogous, Justice Roberts quipped, to a failure to see 
the difference between riding on horseback and flying to the moon. Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014). 
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where the NSA developed strategic partnerships with corporate 
conduits of electronic communications.318 Code-named “PRISM,” 
Snowden considered the operation to be “the biggest single 
contributor to [NSA] intelligence reports.”319 
Exactly how PRISM worked remains a matter of dispute.320 
One leaked NSA slide illustrated the agency collecting information 
“directly from the servers” of Internet giants, including Yahoo, 
Google, Facebook, Apple, and others. 321  But each of these 
companies has fiercely denied any knowledge of PRISM.322 The 
Snowden files implied that NSA might have created or been given 
a “back door” into the servers of Internet giants, but recently 
released court documents cast doubt on that claim and support the 
companies’ contention that they resisted cooperating with the 
NSA.323 
Even without a back door into the servers of tech companies, 
the U.S. government is adept at invisible forms of speech 
regulation that do not disturb the face of things. A prime example 
                                                
 318  Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, The NSA Files Decoded: What the 
Revelations Mean to You, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-
surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1; see also Glenn Greenwald, NSA 
Prism Program Taps into User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-
tech-giants-nsa-data. 
 319 Greenwald, supra note 318. 
 320 See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know about Prism to Date, 
WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), http://washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/. 
 321 Greenwald, supra note 318. 
 322 Lee, supra note 320. 
 323 For Yahoo’s resistance, see Goel and Savage, supra note 285, at B1. See 
also Charlie Savage, Redactions in U.S. Memo Leave Doubts on Data Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2014, at A16. Apple’s website flatly states: “Apple has 
never worked with any government agency from any country to create a ‘back 
door’ in any of our products or services.” Privacy-Government Requests, APPLE, 
http://apple.com/privacy/government-information-requests. For Microsoft’s 
statement that it complied only with “lawful demands” of the government, see 
Nicole Perlroth, et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1. 
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is the issuance of “national security letters” to electronic 
communications providers. 324  The USA Patriot Act, 325  passed in 
response to 9/11 and reauthorized by Congress in 2006, authorized 
the director of the FBI and other officials to issue a national 
security letter (“NSL”) to subpoena certain information about a 
named subscriber’s electronic communications.326 The provider is 
under a legal duty to comply with the NSL and also to say nothing 
about even receiving an NSL, let alone disclosing its contents.327 
So, underneath the free flow of information, the very companies 
running the infrastructure are under the modern equivalent of gag 
orders or prior restraints typical of the too little speech era. 
All of this takes place out of public sight and, for most of the 
last decade, with little judicial review. 328  The little information 
made public by the government shows that the FBI issued 192,500 
NSL letters between 2003 and 2006.329 Reviewing NSLs issued in 
2006, the Department of Justice found over 640 legal violations.330 
In response to the straightjacket which receipt of NSLs puts 
them in, eight large tech companies formed a coalition in 2013 
known as “Reform Government Surveillance.” The coalition 
                                                
 324 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). 
 325  50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). For amendments to the U.S.A. Patriot Act 
subsequent to the Klayman decision, see Shear, supra note 295. 
 326 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a)–(b) (2012). The law did not authorize disclosure of 
the content of any communications. 
 327 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2012) (“No wire or electronic communication service 
provider . . . shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
has sought or obtained access to information or records.”). 
 328 But see Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F. 3d 861, 883 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding in part 
that the nondisclosure requirement is unconstitutional in the absence of the 
government initiating judicial review of the need for such a requirement). 
 329  Ellen Nakashima, Plaintiff Who Challenged FBI’s National Security 
Letters Reveals Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://washingtonpost.com/wp=dyn/content/article/2010/08/10. In response to 
customer concerns, Apple announced on September 18, 2014 that it has received 
fewer than 250 government national security requests as of that date in 2014. 
See Privacy-Government Requests, supra note 287. 
 330  U.S DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND EXAMINATION 
OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, 81 (2008). 
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reached a settlement with the Justice Department that permitted 
member companies to disclose to the public broad information 
about how many NSLs they have received per 1,000 users. 331 
However, coalition members are still prohibited from disclosing 
anything to the person(s) being monitored.332  Twitter did not join 
with other companies in settling with the Justice Department but 
instead filed a pending lawsuit, alleging that it had a First 
Amendment right to speak publicly to its members about 
government requests for personal data.333 This case promises to be 
a throwback to the too little speech era. 
3. A Post-Snowden Era? 
Can technology fix what technology wrought? Less than two 
years after Snowden leaked NSA files, Apple introduced a new 
iPhone and operating system that encrypted a user’s passwords in 
ways that not even Apple can unlock. In its revised privacy policy, 
the company explicitly stated that it no longer had the technical 
capacity to cooperate with government requests for user data from 
the latest iPhones.334  The New York Times carried word of this 
development on page one under the headline, “Signaling a Post-
Snowden era, iPhone Locks Out the N.S.A.” 335  The Android 
operating system is adopting similar strategies.336 
Changes such as these show a genuine pushback against the too 
much speech/too much surveillance problem. Internet companies 
are aware that cooperation with surveillance could cost them 
                                                
 331  Mark Isaac, Twitter Sues U.S. to Expand Public Disclosure of Data 
Requests, N.Y. TIMES, October 8, 2014, at B2. 
 332 See id. 
 333 Id. 
 334  “Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode, and 
therefore cannot access this data.” See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 335 David Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling a Post-Snowden Era, iPhone 
Locks out N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, at A1. In an opinion piece 
published in the New York Times, Snowden agreed that technological changes 
since his original leaks have made a “profound” and positive difference in 
protecting privacy. Edward J. Snowden, The World Says No to Surveillance, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2015, at A23. 
 336 Sanger & Chen, supra note 335, at A3. 
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customers at home and abroad. To solidify trust, the companies 
have joined with human rights groups to form the Global Network 
Initiative (“GNI”). The basic principles of the GNI include the 
statement that “participating companies will respect and protect the 
privacy rights of users when confronted with government 
demands, laws or regulations that compromise privacy in a manner 
inconsistent with internationally recognized laws and standards.”337 
But whether there are such “internationally recognized” standards 
is far from clear, at least to James Comey, director of the FBI.338 
Comey criticized the encryption of the iPhone 6 as turning the 
phone into a device that Apple markets “expressly to allow people 
to hold themselves beyond the law.”339 
The one thing that seems certain is that the NSA will respond 
to the latest technological impediments to data gathering with 
breakthroughs of its own. For instance, the New York Times 
reported (against a request from intelligence agencies not to 
publish the information) that the NSA has succeeded in using its 
code-breaking skills to decipher encrypted information.340  Secret 
programs of de-encryption are the equivalent of a stealth back door 
into reading secure information. 
VII. FROM DIAGNOSIS TO PRESCRIPTION 
Under the heading of too much speech, this Article groups 
together a number of otherwise discrete problems affecting the 
quality of discourse. These problems range from the private control 
one company has over the speech we call “search” to the public 
control governments have to subject speech to universal 
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 338 Sanger & Chen, supra note 335, at A3. 
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surveillance, to the Big Data collection on all of us. Each of these 
separate topics shares a common concern for the growing 
imbalance between the values of free speech and the competing 
values of privacy and reputation. This concern is not new, but the 
age of too much speech brings with it an ideology that decisively 
shifts power over personal data from individuals to corporate 
actors. That power shift is then justified by questionable uses of the 
First Amendment. 
What can be done? By giving us access and links to an 
abundance of information, Google has earned the right to become a 
verb standing for the combined ways Internet services create and 
disseminate new knowledge.341 But we can and should do better at 
bringing privacy and reputation along with us into the information 
age. This section suggests general reforms that would call speech 
back from its own excesses. 
A. Limiting the Reach of Commercial Speech Doctrine 
In 1976, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that 
the advertising of prescription drug prices, even though an 
invitation to engage in a commercial transaction, nonetheless 
implicates First Amendment rights to valuable information.342 As 
mentioned previously, the Court did not hinge its decision on the 
speaking rights of pharmacists to advertise prescription drug 
prices.343 In a case brought by a consumer council representing the 
interests of persons dependent on prescription drugs, the Court 
stressed the rights of the consumer audience to receive price 
information via advertising.344 Quoting from a lower court opinion, 
the Court stressed that the audience had an interest in health that 
was “‘fundamentally deeper than a trade consideration.’”345 Here 
was a case where advertising clearly served important public 
                                                
 341 See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Alphabet with a Capital G., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
14, 2015, at B1. 
 342 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 770–71 (1976). 
 343 See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 344 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755. 
 345 Id. at 755 (quoting trial court decision below). 
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purposes. Presumably, a case about advertising the price of beef 
jerky would have fit less easily within the norms of the First 
Amendment.346 As the Court put it, “not all commercial messages 
contain . . . a public interest message.”347 Nor did the decision rest 
on some putative contribution advertising makes to the workings 
of the free market. Even while recognizing that commercial speech 
was sometimes entitled to First Amendment protection, the 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy court emphasized that advertising 
as an economic activity could be subject to legal regulation when 
the ads proposed unlawful services, or were false or misleading.348 
Compare the limited reach of commercial speech protection in 
1976 with the blanket protection the First Amendment gave to 
commercial speech in the 2011 case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.349 
In Sorrell, the Court struck down a Vermont economic regulation 
that, among other things, restricted sales representatives of 
pharmaceutical companies from gaining access to prescriber-
identifying prescription records kept by pharmacies. These 
salespersons wanted the information to customize their sales 
pitches to the identified physicians. In striking down the Vermont 
law, the Sorrell court came perilously close to announcing the 
death of privacy, since the First Amendment now gave drug 
salespersons access to what we normally consider confidential 
data—data communicated by physicians only to pharmacists or 
health plans in relation to treating patients. 
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, recognition of commercial 
speech arguably fit prevailing norms about the right of consumers 
to make informed decisions about how best to afford prescription 
drugs. In Sorrell, the larger use of commercial speech doctrine 
flouts the state’s interest in regulating pharmacies and in keeping 
                                                
 346 In upholding a state regulation of prescription drug marketing, the First 
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prescriber-identifying prescription information confidential.350 The 
Sorrell court does tout the potential health benefits of permitting 
pharmaceutical representatives to perfect their sales pitches to 
physicians.351 But Vermont chose a regulatory scheme that rested 
on an alternative, reasonable view of the prescription drug market. 
Vermont took the position that keeping prescription drugs as 
affordable as possible was in the health interests of the state’s 
population. The marketing practices of retailers, geared to selling 
high price brand name drugs, harmed these health interests, in the 
judgment of the state.352 Nothing in the commercial speech doctrine 
should have prohibited Vermont from regulating the prescription 
drug business along these lines. But we get too much speech in 
Sorrell when what once was considered economic conduct 
(marketing) subject to reasonable state regulation becomes free 
speech protected from government interference. 
B. Privacy and Public Discourse 
In 1988 the Washington City Paper published a list of Judge 
Robert Bork’s video rentals in an attempt to derail the Senate’s 
confirmation of the judge’s nomination to the Supreme Court.353 To 
prevent a recurrence of such surveillance, Congress passed the 
Video Privacy Protection Act.354 Critics objected to the law as an 
unconstitutional infringement on the free speech rights of video 
storeowners to speak to others who wanted to speak in turn about 
Judge Bork.355 However, snooping on Judge Bork’s video rentals 
                                                
 350 Id. at 2677–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for dismissing 
Vermont’s considerable interests in regulating pharmacies). 
 351 Id. at 2671. 
 352 Id. at 2670; see also IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 
2008). 
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rentals, see Michael Dolan, The Bork Tapes Saga, 
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netted the Washington City Paper only a mundane list of movie 
titles whose informational benefits to the Senate confirmation 
hearings were far outweighed by the intrusions into privacy.356 As 
important as public discourse is, there should be space for private 
nondisclosure, as recognized in tort law. 357  In a world where 
everything we communicate in private, even by renting a video, is 
fair game for public discourse, individuals are likely to adopt 
coping strategies such as self-censorship or even withdrawal from 
participation in public life. 
Not everyone will agree that political debate is demeaned by 
the media’s search for leaks about a candidate’s video rental 
habits. Dirty tricks have a long and storied history in American 
politics, as elsewhere, and we should hardly expect or want to 
cleanse politics of sleaze. But as uncomfortable as it is to draw 
distinctions between highbrow and lowbrow politics, we are worse 
off when we avoid making any substantive judgments about how 
to police the line between private lives and public performance. 
New York Times v. Sullivan358 began as a paean to the need in a 
democracy for debate about the public conduct of public officials 
to be robust and uninhibited. 359  In time, Sullivan sponsored an 
unintended erasure of any difference in the newsworthiness of a 
public official’s private doings and public performance, on the thin 
theory that everything such officials do is relevant to their 
character and fitness for office. 360  Whatever one thinks of this 
expansive reading of Sullivan, it bears remembering that even the 
Supreme Court acknowledges that private persons should be able 
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to recover for damage to their reputations without meeting the 
Sullivan standard.361 
In hindsight, the brouhaha over video rental records seems 
quaint, since we now have computers privy to personal information 
far more sensitive and extensive. In recent years, Internet 
companies have strengthened their privacy policies considerably, 
under pressure from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
nonprofit groups.362 But privacy is still precarious, which leads to 
the next suggestion. 
C. Opt-in Rather than Opt-out Consent 
In 2014, Facebook manipulated the news feeds of nearly 
700,000 users without permission, changing the balance of 
negative versus positive news to see how the changes affected 
people’s emotions and online behavior. 363  At first, Facebook 
responded to public outcries by saying that “its [then] 1.28 billion 
monthly users gave blanket consent to the company’s research as a 
condition of using the service.” 364  One researcher, who is now 
taking the lead to consider the ethics of such experiments, told a 
reporter that he had “not realize[d] that manipulating the news 
feed, even modestly, would make some people feel violated.”365 
                                                
 361 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
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The notion that checking the proverbial “I agree to the terms of 
this service” is a meaningful form of consent is laughable. No 
ordinary person reads through all the small print to see if the 
agreement does grant Facebook the right to conduct experiments 
on its users. What is needed is a fuller use of “opt-in” rather than 
“opt-out” mechanisms for consent. When a privacy policy requires 
users to take steps to protect their privacy, the default position is 
set at making personal information public. By contrast, privacy 
becomes the default setting when a user explicitly has to agree to 
share information. Some states currently require companies to 
obtain explicit or affirmative consent before collecting sensitive 
information such as fingerprints or facial scans. 366  However, a 
proposed “Bill of Rights” from the White House on consumer data 
privacy stops short of recommending that companies obtain 
explicit consent from individuals even when collecting health 
information on them.367 
Many online users may find opt-in consent cumbersome, since 
they want to share information and find it inconvenient to take 
extra steps to do what they wish.368 This may be so, but the harm 
done by opt-out consent seems worse. The default setting on most 
browsers enables sites that users have visited to send those 
invisible cookies that permit the sites to store visitors’ browsing 
histories and to call them up whenever a user revisits.369 This may 
be harmless and make for a better Internet experience but it means 
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that our computers exchange information with company computers 
in silent and largely invisible ways.370 Apparently, in a world of too 
much speech, we are speaking even when we are not. However, 
there is an easy technological fix for this. Users can reset a 
browser’s default settings so as to require their explicit consent to 
receive these cookies.371 For all the annoyance of such steps, the 
“incoming cookie alert” would “nudge” us to think about what 
personal information we wish to store on a website.372  In other 
words, even without a “right to have information forgotten” of the 
European sort, users would already have modest power to make 
the forgetting, rather than the remembering, of personal data their 
default position when engaging in online commerce. 
D. Balancing the Interests of Search Engines and their Audience. 
The problem with search engines is not that they provide us too 
much search. It is that courts have been granting search engines an 
extraordinary level of First Amendment protection, sometimes to 
the detriment of the free speech rights of users and website 
publishers. In the hierarchy of First Amendment values, the highest 
rank goes to speakers who offer opinions on matters of public 
importance.373 As we have seen, many courts and commentators 
regard search engines as speakers of this sort, finding that rankings 
in search results are, like all ratings, inherently subjective.374 
While there is something to this analysis, it favors the interests 
of search companies over the potentially competing free speech 
interests of online users and web publishers. Google’s First 
Amendment position (“we can rank the relevance of various 
websites any way we wish, since we are speaking only opinions”) 
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puts the audience in the position of taking the fairness of Google 
search on faith. This is not a strategy for dealing with a large 
company controlling nearly two-thirds of the U.S. search market 
and 90 percent of the European one.375 The better approach is for 
courts to inquire, in particular cases, whether treating search 
engines as engaged in “opinion speech” is in fact conducive to the 
free speech rights of the audience served by search engines. 
E. Reputation, Dignity, and the Right to be Forgotten 
A final suggestion is more speculative than the others. Most 
critics of too much speech fasten on the loss of privacy to explain 
their discomfort. But the loss goes beyond harm to privacy. 
American law should follow Europe’s lead in recognizing a 
concept of human dignity376 that in appropriate cases might limit 
the marketing of personal data.377 
Reputation is an essential part of individual dignity, and too 
much speech can strip persons of the capacity to remedy mistakes 
and earn a new reputation.378 Google’s CEO, Eric Schmidt, writes 
of virtual identities being “engraved in perpetuity” as if this were a 
good thing.379 But part of what it means to respect the dignity of 
human beings is to look upon us as having the potential for growth, 
change, and transformation. In John Stuart Mill’s philosophy, we 
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are all “experiments in living.”380 Search engines link persons to 
past events in ways that may or may not capture the present self. In 
the U.S., search engines are free to link persons to past stories, no 
matter how stale or irrelevant, no matter the damage to reputation. 
When reputation is divorced from a person’s ability to change, 
then a person is stripped of “the self-presentation [that is part of] 
what it means to be a person.”381 
At its best, the ECJ decision on a “right to be forgotten” is an 
attempt to restore the dignity of reputation to persons. However, 
considerable work needs to be done before the “right to be 
forgotten” can be acceptable in a First Amendment society. The 
most serious problem is that the ECJ decision would require the 
removal of links to even truthful information, a position that the 
Supreme Court has found difficult to accept in other contexts.382 
This Article suggests one principle that could narrow a 
person’s “right to be forgotten” and make that right compatible 
with the First Amendment, which is to set expiration dates on 
personal data, limiting how long such data remains online. As Meg 
Ambrose has argued, information had a natural life cycle before 
the Internet, and perhaps even as recently as pre-search engine 
days.383 Information’s “value depreciate[d] over time” and tended 
to fade or be forgotten. 384 Insofar as search engines interrupt that 
life cycle and re-present old personal information out of context, 
the setting of expiration dates could alleviate the harm.385 
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The social desirability of letting information expire varies 
considerably with the case. Consider three scenarios: (1) the desire 
of the student to have her drunken pirate photograph forgotten;386 
(2) the desire of an ex-felon to have public access to his criminal 
records expire;387 and (3) the desire of a consumer to have personal 
data previously transmitted to Amazon expire.388 I am inclined to 
treat Scenario 3 as an easy case. Individuals should have a clear 
right to set an expiration date for how long they wish Amazon to 
store personal information transmitted as part of a business 
transaction. In Scenario 1, even if one accepted that the posting of 
a drunken pirate picture was ever relevant to the person’s 
qualifications to be a teacher, nevertheless that relevance faded 
over time. At some point the harm to the person outweighed any 
public interest served by search engine links to sites perpetuating 
the photograph. 
Scenario 2 is a closer call. Switzerland takes the position that 
public access to a criminal record should expire when the 
convicted person has served his time. 389  At one point, the 
California Supreme Court ruled that a magazine violated an ex-
felon’s privacy rights by “outing” his eleven-year old record for 
burglary. 390  However, the court subsequently changed its 
position.391 When it comes to criminal conviction records, even old 
information arguably remains relevant to the convict’s neighbors, 
prospective employers and others. At the same time, publicity 
means the ex-felon will never entirely be able to start anew. 
Reasonable people disagree on how to balance these competing 
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equities.392 But the existence of hard cases should not dissuade us 
from advocating expiration dates in Cases 1 and 3. 
Uses of expiration dates or so-called “sunset provisions” to 
protect privacy and reputation are hardly novel. In fact, the federal 
Fair Credit Reporting Act already precludes credit agencies from 
reporting negative information about a consumer that is more than 
seven years old. 393  There seems to be no reason why similar 
expiration norms could not restore to individuals some power over 
personal information in the databases of commercial enterprises. 
F. Dignity in American Law 
As previously stated, post-World War II Europe turned to the 
concept of dignity precisely to ground human rights on a source 
beyond the vagaries of positive law—the source being the status of 
human beings as such.394 In American parlance, to acknowledge 
that a right to dignity’s source lies beyond the Constitution is often 
to condemn it as irrelevant to the work of a judiciary tasked with 
interpreting a written document.395 However, the concept of human 
dignity seems foundational to the entire enterprise of limited 
government that the Constitution ordained.   
In decisions on sexual intimacy, same-sex preferences, and 
same-sex marriage, the concept of human dignity has gained a 
foothold in American law, principally through the opinions of 
Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy has spoken of the right to marry 
as carrying a “dignity and status of immense import.”396 He held 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional 
precisely because it inflicted an “injury and indignity” on same-sex 
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couples that deprived them of an essential part of liberty. 397 This 
line of cases relying on the dignity of marriage culminated in the 
Court’s historic 2015 decision, holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex couples the right 
to marry.398 
Critics regard the concept of dignity as vague and subjective.399 
They question what the concept protects beyond what a person’s 
liberty and equality already cover. One merit of Justice Kennedy’s 
reliance on dignity is that it differentiates what is at stake in same-
sex marriage cases from the more limited stakes in earlier 
decisions about sexual lifestyle.400 In those earlier cases, gays and 
lesbians arguably wanted only to be free to be left alone, free from 
state interference with intimate sexual choices. But in seeking a 
right to marry, same-sex couples demand the dignity that comes 
only with public recognition of the equal worth of their unions. 
The dignity that comes with public recognition is not a status that 
freedom to be left alone can deliver. Instead, social respect is 
crucial to maintaining self-respect.401 It is all very well to say that 
individuals should have an internal sense of self-esteem. But what 
we think of ourselves is often dependent on what people think of 
the groups to which we belong.402 
Reputation is an essential component of individual dignity. 
Self-respect and reputation are not one and the same things. 
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However, self-respect is hard to achieve when one’s choices in life 
no longer determine one’s reputation. This is what the ECJ 
decision saw as the root of the problem with unchecked search 
engine power. The Spaniard wanted to have his reputation updated 
to show he had chosen to take responsibility and to pay off his 
debts. Instead he found that search engines rewound the past and 
re-presented it as the present, to the detriment of any effective 
capacity on the Spaniard’s part to earn back a good reputation. 
Persons without power to alter their reputations are persons 
without a key aspect of dignity.403 
Read in hindsight, the Supreme Court’s first decision 
recognizing a right to privacy in the Constitution seems more about 
dignity than privacy.404 In striking down a state law that prohibited 
even married couples from using contraceptive devices for birth 
control purposes, the Court emphasized that the status of marriage 
was older than the Constitution and carried with it a “noble 
purpose” to the degree of being sacred.405 In tones of indignation, 
the Court wondered whether police could enforce the law by 
spying on the “sacred precincts” of the marital bedroom.406 The 
decision suggested that the Court found the law positively 
indecent, stripping married couples of the dignity to make their 
own choices about procreation. 
So long as the issues were limited to use or possession of birth 
control devices in the martial bedroom, the concept of privacy did 
the same work as a concept of dignity. But in time, the Court 
expanded its ruling to cover the sale and advertising of 
contraceptive devices—hardly “private” matters—and their use by 
individuals whether or not married.407 Yet the Court reached the 
same conclusions. Government violates an essential human dignity 
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when it takes over decision-making at the heart of what it means to 
be responsible for one’s own life.408 
While a full survey of references to dignity in American law is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we can mention some highlights.409 
Dignity underscores an accused’s Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of stomach 
pumping for evidence as “offensive to human dignity.” 410  The 
“basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man.” 411  Dignity explains discomfort with 
human cloning, selling babies and paying fees to a surrogate 
mother (beyond paying medical expenses).412 And it most certainly 
goes to whether persons have a constitutional “right to die with 
dignity.”413   
In a world where information is power, the question of what 
rights individuals have to control the migration of personal 
information into corporate and government databases is a question 
going to the human dignity that attaches to reputation. Fairness to a 
person’s reputation is fragile in a world where searching is a new 
form of speaking largely controlled by one private corporation, at 
most a few, and where that dominance is solidified by First 
Amendment doctrines that protect search engine “speeches” to a 
remarkable degree. Meanwhile, individuals have little effective 
speech against online reputations that may no longer reflect their 
present conduct and circumstances. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Three shifts in First Amendment law combine to create the 
problem of too much speech. The first is classification of data 
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collection and marketing as speech activities, no matter how raw, 
inarticulate, or private the data. The second is categorization of 
search engines as speakers of opinions occupying the highest rung 
on the hierarchy of First Amendment values. The third is the over-
extension of commercial speech doctrine beyond its reasonable 
beginnings. That over-extension, together with the other two 
developments, elevates commercial speech to a normative position 
equal to political speech. 
In its decision recognizing an individual’s limited “right to be 
forgotten” by search engines doing business in Europe, the ECJ 
proposed a new balance between reputation and free speech. For 
all its flaws, the ECJ decision is a welcome pushback against the 
transfer of power over personal data from individual to data 
companies that marks the era of too much speech. This Article has 
suggested that use of familiar mechanisms, such as requiring 
affirmative consent from individuals before collecting or 
marketing their personal information or setting expiration dates on 
how long personal data remains in a company’s database, could 
reintroduce an appropriate amount of “forgetting” back into the 
Internet without harm to the values protected by the First 
Amendment. 	
